Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age by Gruner, Richard S.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2002
Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for
an Information Age
Richard S. Gruner
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 355 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol35/iss2/1
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS: PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER FOR
AN INFORMATION AGE
Richard S. Gruner*
In our present era dominated by information-processing
advances, the nature of useful inventions and patentable discoveries
is changing. New methods of information processing have proven to
be useful tools in a wide variety of consumer, business, and
engineering contexts. This Article considers how patentability
standards should respond. Specifically, the Article seeks to
determine how the patentable subject matter boundaries of the patent
system should be redrawn to ensure that patent rights serve the same
valuable incentive functions concerning intangible innovations in
information processing that these rights have served towards earlier
types of physical engineering.
Until recently, intangible and tangible discoveries occupied two
distinctly different positions in patent law. New discoveries of
intangible intellectual concepts or scientific relationships generally
received no protection.1 Intangible discoveries of these sorts were
viewed as important analytic constructs and communication aids that
should be freely available to all users.2 In contrast, new discoveries of
* Richard S. Gruner is a registered patent attorney and former in-house
counsel for the IBM Corporation. He is presently a Professor of Law at the
Whittier Law School. Professor Gruner is a member of the New York and
California state bars and a graduate of Columbia University School of Law
(LL.M. 1982), University of Southern California Law School (J.D. 1978), and
California Institute of Technology (B.S. 1975).
1. See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939) ("[A] scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
[a] patentable invention.... "). See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 1.03(2) (2001) (stating that one may not obtain a patent for the
discovery of a mere principle or abstract idea, however important).
2. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Many intangible
discoveries-including those concerning some of our most fundamental
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tangible, useful items such as new machines, chemicals, or
manufacturing processes qualified for substantial patent protections.
3
Tangible discoveries providing society with access to these types of
new and beneficial physical objects and processes were protected by
patent laws, placing the making, use, and sale of these inventions
under the exclusive control of their inventors for the life of a patent,
currently a period of twenty years from the patent application date.
4
Recent developments in computer technology and related
business practices are forcing courts to rethink this simple dichotomy.5
A wide variety of information-processing advances embedded in
software products and, more recently, innovative business methods
have been sought to be patented in the last decade. 6 While many of
scientific concepts-serve as instrumental tools in that they aid further
intellectual inquiries and practical engineering efforts. Patent restrictions on the
use of these discoveries are withheld in part to ensure that these further
intellectual inquiries and engineering efforts are not hindered. As Judge Jerome
Frank noted:
It is indeed something of a paradox, but, nevertheless, doubtless wise,
that our patent law gives no reward to the discoverers of scientific
principles, while it protects the discoveries and inventions of lesser
minds, who find new, original and useful applications of such
principles. No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent Office .... If the
statutory provision authorizing the issuance of a patent for a
"composition of matter" were interpreted to validate [patent claims for
scientific principles], then that statutory provision might well be
unconstitutional, since it would authorize the creation of monopolies
which "would discourage arts and manufactures."
Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 435 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (providing for patents concerning "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof").
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
5. Adjustments in patentable subject matter standards frequently follow
changes in technological knowledge. These adjustments are needed to maintain
patent incentives as inducements for design efforts and disclosures in new
technological realms. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172
F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (describing how "sea-changes" in computer
technology required courts to revise and expand notions of patentable computer
programs in order to ensure that patent rewards provided incentives for software
development; these legal changes reflect "the ability of [patent] law to adapt to
new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic principles").
6. The rise in the number of patent applications concerning innovative
software and business methods reflects a shift from earlier efforts to improve
physical tools and processes for business and individual use to a new focus on
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these products and methods have been undeniably useful, the
differences between these intangible information-processing advances
and unpatentable intellectual discoveries have been troublingly
narrow.
New designs for software and computer-based business practices
often turn on new methods of information handling.7  These new
information-handling methods resemble the sorts of intangible ideas
and thought processes that have traditionally fallen outside of patent
protections. However, these new designs are undeniably useful and, in
this respect, resemble earlier types of patent-protected machine and
physical process designs. Confronted with the useful, yet intangible
character of many software advances and related business-method
improvements, federal courts have recently redefined the boundaries
of patentable subject matter to include a substantial range of intangible
discoveries. By rethinking the role of patents in encouraging
technological development and adjusting the range of patentable
inventions to match the changing nature of technological development,
courts are redefining standards of patentable subject matter for an
information age.
The new standards that are emerging from this process include a
growing body of principles for separating patentable intangible
discoveries with constant, predictably useful relationships to physical
contexts from other unpatentable intangible discoveries lacking these
sorts of relationships. 9 These new standards recognize that some
improved control over these physical tools and processes. This improved control
is often achieved through new information-processing methods implemented in
computer-based control or analysis systems. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING
METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) [hereinafter AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
METHODS], at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html (last
visited July 26, 2000) (describing the nature and evolution of patents on useful
business devices and methods).
7. See, e.g., AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1353 (discussing patent application
for a new electronic record-keeping format for information on long distance
calls); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing patent application for a new data-processing
system used in investment management).
8. See, e.g., AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1358-60 (recognizing the patentability
of advances that produce physically significant data-processing results without
necessarily producing physical results).
9. See, e.g., id. at 1355-57; State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373-
75; In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research
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intangible discoveries have immediate utility because they have an
analytic relationship to a physical context even if the discoveries do
not incorporate any physical features of the context themselves. 10 In
short, developing patentability standards identify a range of
technological yet intangible discoveries that help users deal with
physical surroundings, but which involve no physical components
themselves.
These new standards for identifying patentable subject matter in
intangible discoveries must address a number of difficult questions:
What sorts of linkage to a physical environment should be required to
distinguish a patentable method for interpreting or controlling that
environment from a mere intangible description of the characteristics
of the environment and the scientific principles governing the
environment? What features of an intangible discovery should an
inventor be required to understand in order to qualify for a patent?
What are the key features of an intangible discovery that must be
disclosed, corresponding to the structural features or relationships that
are required to be stated to gain a patent for a physical invention? Will
there be an undesirable intellectual "spillover" effect of patents on
intangible discoveries-that is, will allowing patents for intangible
discoveries, coupled with imprecise enforcement of those patents,
place undesirable restrictions on reuse of the intellectual or scientific
concepts embedded in the discoveries? Answers to these sort of
questions are only beginning to develop as courts confront an
increasing number of disputes concerning patents on intangible
discoveries and attempt to clarify the governing patent law standards.
This Article examines the important changes federal courts are
making in patentable subject matter standards for intangible
inventions. The discussion begins with an evaluation of the
technological and institutional pressures driving the development of
new patentable subject matter standards for intangible inventions. The
analysis then continues with a brief review of past tests for patentable
subject matter. It describes why courts applying these earlier tests
generally looked for a physical transformation in the operation of a
device or process and precluded patenting if such a transformation was
missing. The analysis then contrasts these older tests with the new
Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
10. See, e.g.,AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1355-57; State St. Bank & Trust Co.,
149 F.3d at 1368; Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1584;Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055-59.
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standards that federal courts have developed for intangible inventions,
standards that include a broad range of nonphysically transformative
inventions within the range of patentable subject matter.
The Article goes on to propose new standards for distinguishing
patentable, useful inventions having intangible content from
unpatentable intellectual and scientific discoveries. These
distinguishing features are described here with the hope of influencing
public debate and judicial analyses as tests for identifying patentable
subject matter in intangible discoveries are clarified in judicial
opinions and other legal standards.
I. THE NEED FOR NEW PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER STANDARDS
A. Technological Pressures
Significant changes in modes of technological design create
corresponding pressures for new patentable subject matter standards.'1
Since the advent of computer processing of information, technological
design efforts have placed new emphasis on the information-
processing features of business and social practices. 12 Patent law
11. As new technological knowledge makes new types of useful devices and
processes possible, patent standards need to evolve to ensure that patent rewards
will serve as incentives for innovation in applying the new technological
knowledge. To ensure that the promise of patent rewards encourages the
application of newly discovered technologies, we cannot tie the boundaries of
patentable subject matter to our present understanding of technology. Rather,
these boundaries must encourage practically useful designs of diverse types such
that new types of technological applications are presumed to fall within the range
of potential patent rewards as developers first discover and apply new
technological knowledge. This implies that patentable subject matter should
never be limited to today's technologies, but rather should extend to presently
unknown, but practically useful technologies as those technologies are used to
produce useful applications. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 973 (C.C.P.A.
1979) ("To insist on . . . Congressional foresight in construing [patentable
subject matter standards] would be the very antithesis of the Constitutional and
Congressional purpose of stimulating the creation of new technologies-by their
nature unforeseeable-and their progressive development."), ajfd sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
12. The rise of software development as a major business activity and target
of business spending reflects this new emphasis. "With revenues of more than
$200 billion and a growth rate of some 13% a year, software is one of the
world's largest and fastest-growing industries." The Software Industry: The
Birth of a New Species, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter The
Software Industry].
January 2002]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
standards governing intangible methods of information processing are
increasingly important because information-processing advances are
more and more the central features of new designs for products and
processes that are highly useful in business and individual activities.
Aided by increases in computing power and new information-
processing schemes, companies adopting innovative business methods
and communication tools such as the Internet have created the core of
an evolving information-based economy. 13 The resulting advances in
new and useful business offerings are rapidly changing our daily lives.
Unlike innovations in earlier eras, however, many of the advances
produced by this information-based economy do not involve new
physical devices, materials, or processes. Rather, many important
advances-such as most new applications of the Internet-involve
intangible information-processing steps with useful consequences. 14
This type of information-processing innovation contrasts with the
physically transformative innovations in devices, materials, and
manufacturing processes that characterized an earlier era of industrial
development. While its impact is already significant, information-
processing innovation seems likely to produce additional important
changes over the next few years. To provide but a few examples,
significant and pervasive changes are probable in such information-
processing applications as computer-based record keeping and
analysis, Internet-facilitated business transactions, personal computer
usage, and computer-based wireless communication. The results will
reshape our individual activities, our interactions with persons and
communities around us, and our relationships to government officials
and others who act on our behalf. In short, information-processing
These figures focus on companies that produce software products. See id.
at 3-5. Expenditures on software development are also large within companies
which use software to achieve operational improvements rather than as the basis
of marketable products. For example, AT&T, not a major seller of software
itself, spent approximately $1.8 billion on software development in 1994. This
represented sixty percent of the company's total research and development
budget. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT SOFrWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS
[hereinafter PUBLIC HEARING] (Jan. 26-27, 1994) (statement of William Ryan,
AT&T attorney), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/
index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
13. See generally The Software Industry, supra note 12, at 5-6 (discussing
the role of software and the emergence of the Intemet in U.S. businesses).
14. See id. at 7-8.
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innovation is at the heart of many of the most important changes now
underway in our individual, social, business, and governmental
activities.
B. Institutional Needs
Ambiguous patent law standards can lead to excessive
curtailment of activities under overly broad threats of patent
enforcement.15 Ambiguous standards can also produce wasteful
efforts to evaluate and enforce patent rights where the scope of those
rights is rendered obscure by uncertain standards. As they are
clarified, new patent law standards governing intangible information-
processing inventions promise to be highly important in a number of
administrative, judicial, and private contexts. The need for
clarification and consistency of patentable subject matter assessments
in each of these institutional contexts provides further pressure for the
development of new patentability standards governing -intangible
inventions.
In an administrative context, patent applicants will look to these
new standards to shape their patent claims for intangible inventions so
as to include the features necessary to qualify for patents. 16 Patent
15. See Keith E. Witek, Comment, Developing a Comprehensive Software
Claim Drafting Strategy for U.S. Software Patents, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
363, 366-67 (1996); see also Richard H. Stem, Scope-of-Protection Problems
with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 130-31 (1999) (discussing problems
raised by patent protections for computer-implemented inventions).
16. Patent attomeys and agents who assist clients in protecting intangible
information-processing advances have attempted to anticipate developing
judicial standards for patentable information-processing advances and to draft
patent claims accordingly. However, judicial standards in this area have shifted
so quickly and substantially that many practitioners have doubtless had problems
in keeping up with the broadest boundaries of patentable subject matter. See,
e.g., Witek, supra note 15, at 369-89 (discussing how patent practitioners were
hampered by evolving judicial standards over the last thirty years). At one time,
the most common technique for protecting information-processing advances was
to claim protection for these advances in combination with further devices or
device features so that the inventions sought to be patented were not purely
intangible ones. See id. at 371-72 (describing the advantages under past case law
of including the physical details of a software advance's bperative surroundings
in patent claims seeking protection for the advance). More recently, patent
practitioners have recognized the desirability and effectiveness of broader patent
claims addressing purely intangible advances such as innovative software or
information-processing designs. See, e.g., Thomas A. Fairhail, Maximizing the
January 2002]
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examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PT
need new standards to ensure thoroughness and consistency as tf
accept or reject patent applications covering new informatic
processing relationships or procedures. 17
Clarity concerning patentable subject matter tests for intangil
inventions will also help businesses and individuals to shape and p
a variety of private actions. Businesses will consider the availabil
of patents on intangible innovations in determining whether to chain
resources into the development of these types of innovations or ii
other, more productive ventures. 18 Individuals considering transfers
Effectiveness of Software Patents: Drafting and Prosecution Strategies,
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: COMPUTER SOFTWARE: PROTECTION A
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION 95, 104-14 (1998) (emphasizing the desirability
several formats of patent claims that are capable of protecting innovat
software features without including physical invention features that would lij
software protections to particular physical contexts).
17. Recent changes in patentable subject matter standards for intangi
inventions have been recognized by the PTO as potential sources of uncertal
for patent examiners leading to inefficient examination proceedings E
erroneous patent issuance decisions. As a consequence, the PTO has isst
special patent examination guidelines concerning computer-related inventio
including new software designs based on intangible information-process:
advances. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions,
Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996).
The PTO has also recognized that expanded patentable subject mal
standards have produced increased numbers of applications for business metf
patents and that the PTO's examiners may have difficulty in properly review
these applications. Many of the business methods addressed in thi
applications are based on intangible methods for handling financial
management information. To ensure proper attention to these sorts
applications, the PTO established special procedures for the review of pat
applications covering business methods. The PTO also instituted spec
ongoing oversight of the agency's handling of such applications.
AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING METHODS, supra note 6.
18. Absent patent protections, the risk of appropriation of intangi
innovations by competitors may cause potential innovators (and poten
investors who might back the innovators) to divert their resources towards m,
promising ventures. The importance of patent protections in channel'
resources into the development of innovative software designs, rather than i
other commercially significant activities, was described by one software indus
lawyer as follows:
Going into the next century, the key inventions will be in
information processing. [Restricting patents] for software-related
inventions will shift investment away from this area.
The purpose of research and development in any technology is to
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patent rights concerning intangible inventions 19 or investments in
companies holding patents on intangible inventions will apply these
standards to assess the validity and value of the patents involved.2 °
gain an advantage over your competitor. But if your competitor can
legitimately copy the fruits from your R&D and can create a product
that can compete head-on with your product while you are still trying
to build a market for the product, then you've lost.
The long term value of R&D in the marketplace is in the new
functions implemented by software. If such new functions are
protected, investment flows to the industry. If not, investment will dry
up.
PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 12, at 78 (Jan. 26-27, 1994) (statement of Victor
Siber, Senior Corporate Counsel, IBM Corporation).
19. Patents on intangible innovations are means to clarify the transferable
value of those innovations and, by extension, the value of the efforts of experts
that produce such innovations. Recognition of patent rights in software and
other intangible innovations may have broad impacts in shifting our notions of
business value and power:
In today's global highly competitive marketplace, some believe that
we are witnessing a fundamental shift in business history. They are,
we say, progressing from managerial capitalism to intellectual
capitalism. They believe that the importance of intellectual capital will
ultimately cause a dramatic shift in the wealth of the world from
material resources to those who control ideas and information, that is
intellectual property.
A fundamental feature of the patent system is that it establishes a
basis for this intellectual effort to be regarded as an asset and to be
traded in the marketplace. Thus, an effective patent system which
promotes creativity by providing a beneficial and stimulating
environment for inventors is essential for the information age.
PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 12, at 26 (Feb. 10-11, 1994) (statement of Ron
Reiling, Digital Equipment Corporation).
20. Assessments of the validity and scope of a company's patents on key
software or other information-processing innovations may be a central feature of
valuing that company for either purchase or investment purposes. Noting the
importance of software patents in encouraging investment in software
innovators, one observer explained the potential impact of software patents on
investment decisions this way: "[I]nvestors seeking to sponsor a start-up
organization or a new enterprise within a larger company would like to have
some certitude about what it is that they can hope to have some protection for
and.., how their investments can be protected." PUBLIC HEARING, supra note
12, at 7 (Jan. 26-27, 1994) (statement of William Ryan, AT&T attorney); see
also id. at 9-10 (Jan. 26-27, 1994) (statement of Richard LeFaivre, Vice-
President of Advanced Technology, Apple Computer) (noting that Apple
Computer and other large software producers regularly consider the patent
potential of alternative development projects before embarking on those projects;
projects lacking potential patent protections are disfavored because of the risks
January 2002]
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Similarly, companies considering activities or products falling within
particular information-processing patents will need to predict whether
the patents involved will be enforceable and, therefore, an impediment
to the companies' planned actions.
2 1
Finally-and perhaps most importantly-courts called upon to
enforce patents covering intangible discoveries will need clear
standards to determine which, if any, portions of the patents are valid
and enforceable. 22 These last assessments will not only determine the
legitimacy of monetary and injunctive relief in the cases before the
courts, they will also tend to establish persuasive interpretations of the
patents involved, thereby indicating to other potential infringers the
need, if any, to gain licenses to use the patented inventions or to
design around those inventions to produce noninfringing substitutes.23
that innovative products resulting from the projects will be appropriated by
competitors).
21. Accurate assessments of the validity and scope of issued patents are
important in several features of corporate planning. If companies cannot
accurately predict whether their contemplated actions will fall within the patents
and control of other parties, they risk inadvertently backing themselves into
activities that are only discovered to be infringing conduct when a patent holder
threatens litigation. Where infringement of an unexpected patent is encountered
once an intangible practice is already in use in ongoing activities, the results may
include (1) unanticipated financial liability for patent infringement; (2) lost
chances to adopt different business activities that do not require the infringing
practice; (3) lost opportunities to "design around" the patented features of the
practice to produce noninfringing substitutes; and (4) lost chances to negotiate
licenses to undertake the patented practice free from the threat of patent
enforcement litigation. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A.
JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2F (1992)
(discussing patent law standards concerning infringement and remedies,
including compensatory damages).
22. Patentable subject matter standards concerning intangible discoveries-
particularly intangible information-processing discoveries embedded in
innovative software-have bedeviled federal courts for several decades. For a
summary of some of the sources and patterns of judicial confusion in this area,
see id. § 2C[1][f].
23. Subsequent defendants in patent enforcement litigation are free to
challenge the validity of a patent that was unsuccessfully challenged by an initial
litigant. See id. § 2F[4][a]. However, an initial judicial interpretation of a
disputed patent may (perhaps correctly) be seen by subsequent defendants as an
accurate prediction of the probable interpretation of additional federal courts
should the validity and scope of the patent be relitigated. Hence, the
interpretation of an initial court will have a strong practical effect in defining the
scope of patent rights in later licensing and litigation settlement negotiations.
See id. § 2F[4][a][i-iii].
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C. Policy Goals
The policy goals underlying patentable subject matter standards
also suggest a need to make changes in these standards to
accommodate intangible inventions. Patentable subject matter
standards have a narrow but important role in patent law.24 In order to
appreciate the policy goals of patentable subject matter standards, it is
necessary to understand portions of the patent law context surrounding
these standards.
Patentable subject matter standards are but one of several types of
tests that an invention must satisfy to qualify for a patent.25 Each of
these tests serves a somewhat different function in identifying
inventions that warrant a patent. By understanding the other tests for
gaining a patent and the purposes that those other tests serve, we can
identify the separate purposes to be promoted by patentable subject
matter standards. Those purposes can in turn help us to define the
proper scope of patentable subject matter standards as they apply to
intangible inventions.
In the discussions of patentable subject matter standards
throughout this Article, it is assumed for the sake of simplicity that the
patentability of the intangible inventions being examined turns solely
on whether or not those inventions constitute patentable subject
matter. That is, all other issues regarding the patentability of the
inventions are assumed, for the purposes of the discussions here, to be
resolved in favor of the patentability of those inventions. However, in
assessments of real patent applications concerning intangible
inventions, a finding of patentable subject matter will seldom lead
directly to a finding that the invention involved warrants a patent.26
Rather, even if patentable subject matter is present in a given
invention, the availability of a corresponding patent will often be far
from certain. Tests for patentable subject matter serve a "gatekeeper"
24. See CISUM, supra note 1, § 1.01.
25. For a complete description of the standards that an invention must meet
in order to qualify for a patent, see id. § § 1.0 1-6.04.
26. The analytic framework adopted in this Article-and in most appellate
court opinions addressing patentable subject matter standards-assumes,
arguendo, that all other invention features needed for patenting are present,
leaving the disputed issue of patentable subject matter to determine whether a
patent should issue. In this sense, the patentable subject matter standards
described in this Article identify features of intangible inventions that are
necessary but not sufficient to warrant a patent.
January 2002]
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function, identifying the range of innovations for which other
fundamental considerations leading to the granting or withholding of a
patent need to be assessed. An innovation that includes patentable
subject matter is just potentially patentable. Whether a patent on such
an invention should issue still turns on other important factors
including: whether the same invention has already been publicly
disclosed by another party;27 whether the invention, while new, is just
an obvious variation of a previously disclosed design or practice;28 and
whether a timely patent application has been submitted.29
Thus, for example, if a new type of business method for
identifying probable customers for a particular type of business is
deemed to be patentable subject matter, a patent would not
automatically issue. Rather, a patent covering this business method
would only be appropriate if there was no evidence of prior public use
or disclosure of the method at the time it was asserted to have been
invented; if the method did not seem to be a mere obvious variation of
other business methods already in use at that time; and if the developer
of the method submitted a timely patent application.
30
In essence, recent changes involving a broader acceptance of
intangible inventions as potentially patentable subject matter ensure
that these types of inventions are not categorically rejected for
patenting, but are instead assessed in terms of the individual
characteristics of particular inventions. As one observer noted with
respect to business method patents, recent case holdings "dol not
necessarily lower the standard for obtaining patents on business
methods. The... holding[s] merely shift[] the patent inquiry away
from the 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter analysis to the novelty, utility,
nonobviousness, and specification inquiries. This shift implies only
that business method claims will be analyzed individually rather than
collectively."
31
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
28. See id. § 103.
29. See id. § 102(b).
30. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343,
1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that a "one-click" online purchasing
method probably constituted patentable subject matter, but expressing doubts
about the validity of a patent on the method due to evidence that the method was
a mere obvious variation of methods already disclosed in the same field).
31. Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and
Should Patent Law Play?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9, 8 (1999), at
366
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Assessments of the utility, novelty, and nonobviousness of
intangible inventions and the timeliness of corresponding patent
applications will require invention-specific fact finding and analysis.
These newly important inquiries and analyses will, in turn, raise
several types of problems that the patent system has previously
avoided by excluding intangible inventions from patenting as a group.
These problems include weaknesses in the patent examination system
due to gaps in available records of publicly disclosed designs
(commonly referred to as "prior art") that are needed to assess the
novelty and nonobviousness of current intangible inventions, and a
lack of training and expertise of patent examiners in computer and
business methods that are relevant to many intangible inventions.
32
Other potential problems relate to the possibility that intangible
inventions may lack clear means to measure novelty-that is, these
inventions may be so ill-defined that the assessment of whether they
are different from prior intangible information-processing methods
may be difficult.33 Similarly, the principles for assessing the scope
and inventive significance of differences between prior intangible
practices and a new intangible invention may be uncertain, leading to
unusual difficulty in assessing the obviousness of the new invention in
light of existing practices at the time of the invention.34
http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/v4i2a9-grusd.html.
32. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 12, at 27 (Jan. 26-27, 1994)
(statement of Kaye Caldwell, President, Software Entrepreneurs Forum); see
also id. at 73 (Jan. 26-27, 1994) (statement of Richard Stallman, Free Software
Foundation) (describing problems with PTO examiners' evaluations of the
obviousness of software advances).
33. See Shawn McDonald, Patenting Floppy Disks, or How the Federal
Circuit's Acquiescence Has Filled the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 9 (1998), at http://jolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol3/
home art9.html (describing some of the difficulties in identifying and evaluating
the novel features of newly developed software).
34. The PTO has recognized that the nonobviousness of business method
advances may be hard for patent examiners to assess. To combat errors in this
area, the PTO has issued special guidance to its examiners regarding
nonobviousness evaluations for intangible business method advances. See U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, FORMULATING AND COMMUNICATING
REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103 FOR APPLICATIONS DIRECTED TO COMPUTER-
IMPLEMENTED BUSINESS METHOD INVENTIONS, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
menu/busmethp/busmethl03rej.htm (last modified Feb. 7, 2001).
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While these types of problems are not insubstantial, some of them
are clearly temporary.35 As patents and other prior art documents
covering intangible inventions are created with increasing frequency,
gaps in prior art records will narrow. Existing prior art records will
also become more easily accessible to patent examiners as growing
numbers of patents for intangible inventions are examined and
corresponding sources of prior art materials are identified. Standards
for evaluating the novelty and nonobviousness of intangible inventions
should be clarified as more and more patent applications concerning
these inventions are evaluated by PTO examiners and courts. While
there will be a period of uncertainty, there is no indication that these
temporary problems concerning the evaluation of intangible invention
patents will be any more serious than comparable problems
concerning other technologies which were once thought to be
unpatentable, and then were included in patentable subject matter
through statutory or case law changes.
36
In sum, a broad view of patentability does not automatically mean
a large number of patents. 37 Rather, recognizing that a category of
innovations constitutes patentable subject matter simply secures the
opportunity for a few innovations within the category that are new,
35. See John M. Carson & Eric M. Nelson, Legal Victory for Electronic
Commerce Companies: State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group
Signals Fall of Last Barrier to Internet Software Patents, 21 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 193, 206 (1999).
36. The PTO believes that accurate reviews of intangible business methods
patents can be achieved through increased recruiting of patent examiners with
business backgrounds, improved training of examiners regarding innovative
business methods, and expanded prior art searching. See AUTOMATED DATA
PROCESSING METHODS, supra note 6.
37. At present, even under the broadly inclusive patentability standards being
applied by federal courts, relatively few applications for business method patents
are being submitted to the PTO. See id. In fiscal year 1999, the total number of
business method patent applications was 2658. See id. This represented only
about one percent of all patent applications in this period. See id. With this total,
business method patents represented a relatively small fraction of the total
number of patent applications addressing communication and information-
processing technologies. Other types of inventions in this field with more patent
applications than business methods during fiscal year 1999 included the
following: Digital and Multiplex Communications Technology (7131
applications), Display Data Processing (3898 applications), Telecommunications
(3480 applications), Networked Computer Data Processing (3190 applications),
Databases and Word Processors (3068 applications), and Dynamic Information
Storage (2905 applications). See id.
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
nonobvious, and the subject of timely patent applications to qualify for
patent protections and rewards.
The promise of patent rewards will generally encourage
innovation and invention disclosures concerning patentable designs.
Hence, the choice of which categories of innovations we view as
patentable subject matter is essentially a choice of where we wish the
powerful incentives of the patent system to have effect and to promote
innovation, invention disclosures, and associated public benefits. This
Article argues that the incentive tool of patent rewards should be
broadly applied to achieve correspondingly broad public benefits.
38
H. SOURCES OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER STANDARDS
Patentable subject matter is defined through a combination of
constitutional, legislative, and judicial standards. Constitutional
provisions authorizing Congress to establish a patent system and
associated patent rights indicate that these rights are to be limited to
certain types of discoveries. 39 Statutory language implementing these
constitutional provisions currently limits patentable subject matter to
four categories of potentially patentable inventions.40  However,
judicial analyses have interpreted the statutory categories very broadly
and have developed additional tests beyond membership in these
categories for determining the presence of patentable subject matter.41
Judicial analyses also have identified several types of discoveries that
are unpatentable because they lack either the inventive synthesis or
practical application needed for patenting.42 Each of these sources of
patentable subject matter standards is examined briefly in this section.
A. Constitutional Sources
1. The constitutional text
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
3 8. See discussion infra Part IV.
39. See discussion infra Part II.A.
40. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
41. See discussion infra Part II.C.
42. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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respective Writings and Discoveries." 43 This grant of congressional
power is unusual in that it is one of the few in the Constitution that
specifies the purposes and goals of the power granted.44
In order to appreciate the goals that the Framers of the
Constitution sought to further through this provision, it is necessary to
understand the somewhat complex linguistic structure used in this
constitutional passage. This is an example of a "balanced sentence," a
form of formal drafting common at the time the Constitution was
written. In this form of drafting, the two components of the first
portion of the passage (referring to the progress of science and the
progress of useful arts) were linked to the corresponding two
components of the last portion of the passage (referring to the
exclusive right of authors to their respective writings and the exclusive
right of inventors to their respective discoveries). The first component
of the first portion of this passage (the progress of science) was related
to the first component of the second portion (the protection of the
exclusive right of authors to their respective writings). The second
component of the first portion (the progress of useful arts) was related
to the second component of the second portion (the protection of the
exclusive right of inventors to their respective discoveries). Thus, this
clause authorized Congress to create an intellectual property system in
which the "Progress of Science" was to be promoted through the
protection of "Writings" of "Authors" and "the Progress of... useful
Arts" was to be promoted through the protection of "Discoveries" of
Inventors.
'A5
The "science" in this formulation did not mean natural science as
we now know it, but rather "knowledge" or "learning" in a broader
sense.46 Hence the promotion of science through the protection of
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
44. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("It is
interesting to note that this particular grant is the only one of the several powers
conferred upon the Congress which is accompanied by a specific statement of
the reason for it.").
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally Robert I. Coulter, The Field of
the Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 487,
491 (1952) (discussing statutory use of "useful arts"); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U. S. Constitution, 18 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949) (discussing interpretation of "useful arts").
46. See Lutz, supra note 45, at 51; Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a
Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 11-12
(1966).
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works of authors meant the promotion of knowledge and learning
through the granting of exclusive rights to authors providing them
with temporary control over certain uses of their writings. Congress's
exercise of these powers is reflected in our present day copyright
statutes.
47
The authorized scope of the patent system is, therefore, dependant
on the other portion of this constitutional language which provides for
the creation of intellectual property rights in discoveries as a means to
promote the progress of the useful arts. Understanding the meaning of
this last term is obviously critical to understanding the goals and
congressional powers that this passage addresses. Unfortunately, the
intended meaning of the useful arts to be advanced by patents remains
obscure.
2. Judicial interpretations of the constitutional text
a. constitutional limits on patentable subject matter
In Graham v. John Deere Co. ,48 the Supreme Court noted that the
above constitutional language places limits on Congress's ability to
grant patent rights:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent
power stems from a specific constitutional provision which
authorizes the Congress "To promote the Progress of...
useful Arts .... " The clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often
exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the
English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in
the "useful arts."... The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by
the stated constitutional purpose.
49
As an example of the limiting impact of the constitutional
provisions addressing patents, Congress could not authorize a patent
that would withdraw access to information already in the public
47. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958-59 (C.C.PA. 1979) (describing the
intent of the drafters of the Constitution to promote science through copyright
protections and to promote the useful arts through patent protections), affid sub
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
48. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
49. Id. at 5-6.
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domain. Such a patent would reduce rather than expand the range of
useful knowledge presently available to the public and would therefore
hinder the progress of the useful arts. As the Court noted in Graham:
"[innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of... useful
Arts.' This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may
not be ignored." 50
While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the point, the
implication of the Court's discussion in Graham is that Congress may
not rely on its patent powers to award patents that promote progress
outside of the useful arts.51 Even if they did promote the production or
disclosure of some additional form of knowledge, patents addressing
types of knowledge outside the useful arts would be unlikely to
promote those arts. Such patents, like those criticized in Graham,
would be invalid for failure to promote the sole constitutionally
approved goal for patents.
b. from "useful arts" to "technological innovation "-shifting
points of reference in judicial interpretations
For many years, courts gave little attention to the scope of the
"useful arts" that patents were intended to further. New designs for
physical devices and processes with practical utility were assumed to
fall within the useful arts with almost no consideration of whether
other discoveries might qualify as well.
When expanding technological knowledge forced courts to
consider whether designs for new types of practical items and
processes fell within the useful arts, several courts concluded that the
term "useful arts" was an outmoded reference to knowledge about
what we now call "technology." These courts interpreted the useful
arts as being coextensive with the "technological arts." 52 This
50. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
51. See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU
L. REv. 1419, 1426-27.
52. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The
exclusive right, constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of
advancing the useful arts-the process today called technological innovation.");
In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("The phrase
'technological arts,' as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase 'useful
arts' as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution."); In re Musgrave,
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
approach tied assessments of patentable subject matter to current
discussions among engineers and others about the nature and
distinctive features of technological knowledge and innovation.
53
Expecting to rely on insights about technology in the engineering,
scientific, and business communities, courts hoped to define the scope
of patentable subject matter by defining the range of technology.
Unfortunately, the scope of technology has proven to be no easier
to define than the scope of the useful arts.54  While technology
certainly involves artificial-that is, human-created-things or
procedures, this feature does not distinguish technology from many
other human creations, such as literature or music, which are useful
and beneficial in our lives. As John R. Thomas noted:
[A]rticulation of a useful typology between technology and
other aspects of human culture has proven exceptionally
difficult. Human engagement with the artificial has become
so complete that distinguishing technological things from
those that are not has perplexed not only the courts, but
even epistemologists and the most accomplished of
technological observers. 55
While the task of identifying the distinctive features of
technological knowledge is certainly complex, this Article argues that
the task of defining technological knowledge need not be completed in
its entirety in order to delineate the proper scope of patentable subject
matter. We need not fully understand what technology is, but rather
need only understand how we develop, transmit, and use technological
knowledge. Since patent incentives are concerned with the growth
and dissemination of useful knowledge, determining the proper
subject matter scope of patent incentives and controls requires an
understanding of effective steps for developing and transmitting
technological knowledge and a further understanding of the means
whereby patent rewards can encourage these steps.
431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
53. See, e.g., CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE
PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 154-60 (1994).
54. See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 895-96 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
55. John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 34-35 (1999); see also MITCHAM, supra
note 53, at 154-60 (emphasizing the need for a conceptual framework for
discussing technology).
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As courts that have equated technological advances with
patentable subject matter have assumed, there are distinctive and
functionally important differences between the development and
dissemination of technological information and the acquisition and
dissemination of other types of useful knowledge. 56  These
differences-particularly differences in the purposes and means for
distributing technological information-form the basis for subject
matter limits on patent rights and incentives. Patentable subject matter
standards limiting patents to types of inventions that are capable of
being described in terms of technological information and being made
available to the public through transfers of this type of information
will tailor patent incentives to the full range of technological means
for solving widely encountered practical problems. In short, where
technological solutions can be effectively developed and disseminated,
patent incentives should attach.
The distinctive features of technological information transfers
and the boundaries on patentable subject matter that these features
imply are examined in later sections of this Article.
57
3. Commentators' reconstructions of the useful arts
Responding to the failure of federal courts to adopt consistent
views in this area, a number of commentators have attempted to
identify the essential features of the useful arts as they are addressed in
the Constitution.
58
a. useful arts as engineering techniques
To some observers, the term "useful arts" as used in the
Constitution means useful techniques or crafts which are developed
through engineering.59 Under this view, the promotion of the useful
arts through the protection of the works of inventors means the
promotion of what we might now refer to as practical engineering
through grants of exclusive rights to discoverers of new engineering
designs or techniques. This approach emphasizes the constitutional
focus on "useful" knowledge and avoids tying the beneficial impacts
56. See discussion infra Part III.
57. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
58. See, e.g., Coulter, supra note 45, at 496; Durham, supra note 51, at
1424; Stem, supra note 15, at 127-28 n.98.
59. See Durham, supra note 51, at 1424-25.
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of the patent system to any particular level of technical knowledge.
Further, within this framework, the patent system is concerned with
expanding the boundaries of useful engineering knowledge regardless
of where those boundaries presently stand.60
While a desirable beginning, equating useful arts with
engineering techniques does not provide a meaningful way to
distinguish between useful engineering knowledge, which the patent
system should further, and other types of useful knowledge that have
some practical utility, but which the patent system was not intended to
reach. This type of approach simply shifts the point of ambiguity from
detemining the reach of useful arts to determining the scope of
engineering. A deeper understanding of the important characteristics
of engineering knowledge and the ways that patent rights can increase
and disseminate engineering knowledge is needed to clarify the proper
boundaries of patentable subject matter and the patent system. These
features are addressed at a later point in this Article.6 1 Once these
features are understood, patent rights can be limited to situations
where they are likely to have a beneficial impact on the generation and
dissemination of new engineering knowledge.
b. useful arts as industrial activities
Some commentators have expressed the view that the useful arts
referred to in the Constitution include only industrial activities. For
example, according to Alan L. Durham, "[lt is reasonable to conclude
that industry is what the Framers intended to encourage by exclusive
rights and that industry is what they meant by the 'useful arts.'
62
While industrial activities were probably at the core of the
activities that the patent system was intended to promote, there is no
indication that the drafters of the Constitution intended the patent
system to promote only industrial activities as opposed to non-
industrial business activities or consumer activities. Rather, the
drafters of the Constitution seem to have purposefully used broader
language, directing the patent system to the promotion of the "useful
arts" instead ofjust the "industrial arts."63
60. See id. at 1426-28.
61. See discussion infra Part III.
62. Durham, supra note 51, at 1454.
63. See Coulter, supra note 45, at 495-96, 499-500.
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Indeed, a restricted vision of the patent system that sees the only
goal of the system as being the furtherance of industrial activities
ignores the important role of the patent system in enhancing everyday
activities in private settings and nonindustrial business contexts. Our
most commonly invoked paradigm of the patentable invention-the
better mousetrap -is primarily a means to improve private rather
than industrial activities. This type of improvement in nonindustrial
activities was probably as much a part of the goals of the drafters of
the Constitution's patent clause as was the improvement of industrial
activities. Thus, while the improvement of industrial activities is an
important aim of the patent system, it is not the sole objective of that
system. 65 Consequently, the range of patentable subject matter and
activities furthered by patent incentives should not be restricted to
items and practices used in industrial activities.
c. useful arts as a historical specialty
Another group of analysts has viewed the useful arts referred to in
the Constitution as a craft domain defined by historical practices. This
approach attempts to define the useful arts in terms of the types of
industrial and mechanical arts that were present when the Constitution
was drafted and the types of specialists who pursued those arts.66
According to this view, drafters of the Constitution probably felt that
the useful arts "embraced the so-called industrial, mechanical and
manual arts of the 18th century.' 67 To translate this range of activity
64. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They
Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest
for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 935
(2000). See generally Emerson: Quotes, available at http://www.
transcendentalists.com/emersonquotes.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) ("If a
man write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mouse-trap
than his neighbor, tho' he build his house in the woods, the world will make a
beaten path to his door."). This quote is believed to originate from either
Ralph Waldo Emerson or Elbert Hubbard. It is not found in any of Emerson's
writings.
65. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999)
(recognizing that the patent system extends to nonindustrial innovations such
as new business methods concerning financial records).
66. See Coulter, supra note 45, at 496; see also Durham, supra note 51, at
1429-37 (discussing a historical interpretation of the useful arts).
67. Coulter, supra note 45, at 496.
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into today's world, commentators adopting this view would consider
the types of persons involved in these eighteenth-century activities and
how those persons' efforts were conducted and promoted at the time
the Constitution was written. Once these are identified, current limits
on patentable subject matter could be adjusted to provide the same
type of assistance to comparable parties in today's engineering design
fields. Overall, this approach to interpreting the patent clause of the
Constitution seeks to identify the historical innovation and knowledge
dissemination processes which the patent system was intended to
further and to direct the patent system toward our present counterparts
to these historical processes.
68
Persons who practiced in the useful arts in the eighteenth century
were largely manual laborers of limited education who carried out
their work in accordance with specialized knowledge about how "to
do practical things in practical ways to satisfy the physical needs of
mankind., 69 These individuals accumulated and applied knowledge in
the useful arts as distinguished from the "cultural arts" studied and
taught in universities. 70 Cultural arts, which were taught and furthered
through universities, included grammar, logic, arithmetic, music,
painting, poetry, and drama.
71
Processes for promoting the useful arts operated outside of
university programs. These processes enhanced practical design
knowledge through the accumulation of bodies of design
information. 72  Bodies of design information were gathered and
transferred to practitioners as means of solving specific design
problems without the knowledge systemization and formal
presentation that were characteristic of knowledge taught in
universities.
73
The interpretation that the useful arts encompass modem
counterparts of these eighteenth-century activities provides us with
68. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); see also Coulter,
supra note 45, at 499-500 (arguing that useful arts should not be confined to a
purely historical meaning).
69. Coulter, supra note 45, at 496; see also Stem, supra note 15, at 128 n.98
("The best modem synonym for the term 'useful arts' ... is 'bodies of
knowledge relating to the trades that artisans ply."').
70. See Coulter, supra note 45, at 494, 496-97.
71. See id. at494, 496.
72. See id. at496.
73. See id.
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some useful guidance. It suggests that the useful arts include modem
design fields that are governed at least in part by unsystematized
practical knowledge rather than just the more systematized knowledge
built up through scientific and mathematical discoveries. The patent
system should certainly promote the discovery and disclosure of
unsystematized knowledge about useful items and processes.
However, delineating the useful arts as they may have existed in the
eighteenth century does not provide a viable means to distinguish
between types of unsystematized practical knowledge gathering that
the patent system should and should not promote. The types of
unsystematized, but useful information the patent system should
encourage inventors to accumulate and disseminate is still left largely
undefined. This is the case because the essential features
distinguishing patentable advances from other useful discoveries in the
eighteenth century remains uncertain, leaving us with few if any
general principles to use in constructing current standards.
d. useful arts as means for physical coping
A more precise definition of the useful arts has focused on the
notion that these arts are concerned with knowledge about how to
organize or transform physical features of our surroundings to our
practical advantage. 4 For example, in Alan L. Durham's view, "the
real key to the most fundamental attribute of the useful arts, especially
as to procedures, [is that the useful arts] all relate to controlling the
forces and materials of nature and putting them to work in a practical
way for utilitarian ends serving mankind's physical welfare.",75 In
short, adherents to this view contend that the useful arts specify
techniques for useful transformations of physical environments
through physical items and processes. 6
Under this interpretation of the useful arts, an advance falls within
the useful arts if either the advance's means or ends of operation-i.e.,
its results-involve physical transformations. 77  Physically
transformative means and ends are not both required. 8 Thus, a new
74. See id. at 496-97.
75. Durham, supra note 51, at 1440 (quoting Coulter, supra note 45, at 498).
76. See id. at 1445-52.
77. See id. at 1473 n.277 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
78. See id. at 1521-22.
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electronic calculator design that entails new physical means-i.e., new
calculator circuits-to pursue a nonphysical end-i.e., improved
calculations-is within the useful arts because it constitutes a new
design for a physical tool. Similarly, an intangible data analysis
practice used to evaluate temperature readings from a rubber mold and
to signal when the mold should be opened at the end of a molding
cycle is also within the useful arts. This sort of procedure entails non-
physical means-i.e., data analysis steps-to accomplish a physical
end-i.e., the opening of the rubber mold. This type of advance
entails a new, improved way to use an existing physical tool, in this
case a rubber mold.
In several recent cases discussed later in this Article,7 9 federal
courts have rejected the view that the useful arts-and the
corresponding range of patentable inventions-are limited to physical
design problems. In an age when new computer capabilities have
made possible diverse types of useful information-processing
discoveries, the maximum range of beneficial new inventions is
probably encouraged not by limiting patents to physical designs, but
rather by extending patentable subject matter and patent incentives to
these new types of useful but intangible information-processing
discoveries. Hence, limiting patentable subject matter to the types of
physical inventions that dominated earlier eras is probably unwise.
Even if a physical transformation or structure is not a necessary
feature of a patentable invention, inventions achieving physical
transformations or including physical structures may provide good
examples of more basic characteristics that are needed in patentable
inventions. For example, an invention producing physical
transformations in a surrounding environment or incorporating
physical operating structures that interact in a useful way with a
physical environment may have a consistency of operation and utility
that should be fundamental requirements of patentable subject
matter. 80 The presence of such regular operations and predictable
utility are criteria that may be valuable in distinguishing patentable
discoveries from other, less consistently valuable types of intangible
creations.81 I will return to the notion that regular operation and
79. See discussion infra Part IV.
80. See Durham, supra note 51, at 1448.
81. See id. at 1473.
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consistent utility may serve as standards for patentable subject matter
at a later point in this Article.
82
B. Congress's Statutory Implementation
1. The statutory text
Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 contains Congress's most
recent statutory definition of patentable subject matter (sometimes
referred to as "statutory subject matter"). 3 This statutory definition
provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title., 84 The "conditions and
requirements of this title" referred to in this definition include
requirements that a patentable invention be novel, a nonobvious
advance over prior designs, the subject of a timely patent application,
and described completely in the patent application. 85  Thus, an
invention which meets the statutory definition of patentable subject
matter must still meet these additional statutory tests in order for a
patent to be warranted for that invention.
86
2. Judicial interpretations of the statutory categories
The Supreme Court has stated that the four categories of
patentable subject matter mentioned in the Patent Act-processes,
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter-describe the
full range of patentable subject matter.87 However, due to concern
about excluding new types of useful advances from patent incentives,
the Court has interpreted the four statutory categories very broadly, to
the extent that these categories provide little, if any, guidance about
82. See discussion infra Part IV.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
84. Id.
85. See generally CHISUM, supra note 1, §§ 1.01-6.04 (discussing patent
law standards governing the granting of utility patents for useful inventions).
86. See id.
87. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o
patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious,
unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of
35 U.S.C. § 101 ...
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the minimum content of a patentable invention." The Court has taken
two approaches in broadening its views about the scope of the
statutory categories of patentable subject matter.
In some analyses, the Court has stretched the meaning of the
terms describing the statutory categories significantly beyond the
common meaning of those terms. 89 The result is that these terms seem
to impose few limits on statutory subject matter.90 For example, in
one case newly engineered bacteria were held to be patentable subject
matter on the grounds that the bacteria constituted both new
manufactures and new compositions of matter.91 The bacteria were
found to be "manufactures" because the bacteria were artificially
constructed by human effort.92 The bacteria were also found to be
new "compositions of matter" because they entailed human-controlled
assemblies of matter in new combinations and structures. 93 While
these conclusions are not irrational, they certainly reflect very broadly
inclusive interpretations of the statutory terms defining the categories
of patentable inventions.
In other analyses of patentable subject matter, the Court has taken
a second approach which treats inventions within the statutory
categories as illustrations of certain fundamental features that
patentable inventions must possess.94 Under this approach, the key to
identifying patentable inventions is not a mechanical comparison of
assertedly patentable discoveries with the statutory categories, but
rather a search within these discoveries for more fundamental features
which must be present in patentable subject matter.95 These essential
88. See id. at 476-83; see also Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for
Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional
Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 33-35 (1999)
(noting that courts have no coherent methodology for determining if computer-
related and algorithm-related inventions are patentable subject matter);
Thomas, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that the scope of the statutory term
"process" appears coextensive with almost any possible endeavor).
89. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
90. See Thomas, supra note 55, at 4.
91. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
92. Id.
93. Id. at312-13.
94. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
95. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
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features which distinguish patentable subject matter from other
intellectual advances have not been analyzed in depth by the Supreme
Court, but have been considered more thoroughly by lower federal
courts. 9 6  The analyses of lower federal courts in this area are
discussed in the next subsection of this Article. Despite its failure to
undertake its own analyses of the necessary invention features
defining the boundaries of patentable subject matter, the Supreme
Court has suggested that these boundaries should be broadly
construed. 97  According to the Court, a broadly inclusive view of
patentable subject matter is appropriate because "Congress intended
statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made
by man."
98
C. Judicial Tests for Patentable Subject Matter
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court's refusal to look
exclusively to the statutory categories in identifying patentable subject
matter, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has on several
occasions turned away from the statutory categories and instead
considered whether particular inventions had certain essential
characteristics needed in patentable subject matter.99 Specifically, the
Federal Circuit court has looked to whether inventions are defined in
specific terms and produce results with practical utility.100 As the
court explained in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.:
101
96. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed.Cir. 1999); In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
97. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
588 n.9 (1978).
98. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952)).
99. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear appeals from federal district courts on patent matters. See 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a) (2000). Hence, the views of the Federal Circuit on the scope of
patentable subject matter effectively establish nationwide tests subject only to
revision by a contrary Supreme Court decision or a statutory change by
Congress.
100. See State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1375; In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1540-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Arrhythmia Research Tech.,
Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058-61 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
101. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
The question of whether a [patent] claim encompasses
statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the
four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to-
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter-
but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject
matter, in particular, its practical utility.'0 2
Using this approach, in In re Alappat,0 3 the court held that a new
device is patentable subject matter if it constitutes a specific machine
that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result.'0 4 The Federal
Circuit's current standards indicate that "the essential characteristics
and practical utility of [a claimed invention] are more important than
determination of which category the claims are directed to. Therefore,
the primary criterion for meeting patentability under § 101 is that the
invention must product [sic] a useful, concrete, and tangible result." 10 5
While the Federal Circuit's recent decisions seem to diminish the
importance of the terminology used in the Patent Act to describe the
categories of patentable subject matter,10 6 these decisions do not as yet
provide a clear image of the "specific" features and "useful, concrete,
and tangible results" that a process or device must have in order to
constitute patentable subject matter. A later portion of this Article
proposes a systematic approach for identifying the necessary features
of patentable subject matter. 10 7  Greater clarity concerning these
features will be useful in guiding patent applicants and shaping future
federal court decisions in this area.
D. Special Doctrines Limiting Patentable Subject Matter
Separate from the generally applicable tests federal courts have
used for identifying patentable subject matter, these courts have also
developed a number of narrowly focused doctrines that limit the scope
of patentable subject matter. 0 8  These doctrines focus on specific
102. Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted).
103. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
104. See id. at 1544.
105. Suzanne R. Swanson, The Patentability of Business Methods,
Mathematical Algorithms and Computer-Related Inventions After the Decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street, 8 FED. CIR. B.J.
153, 158 (1999).
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
107. See discussion infra Part V.
108. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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types of discoveries that are excluded from patentable subject
matter. 10 9  The doctrines define essentially negative tests for
patentability, precluding a given discovery from obtaining a patent if it
falls within one of the doctrines.'
10
Limiting doctrines of this sort have been developed on a variety
of grounds. 1 Most of these limiting doctrines are aimed at keeping
specific types of discoveries freely available to the public by ensuring
that patent controls will not limit public access to those discoveries.'12
The most commonly applied patent-limiting doctrines have dealt with
mathematical and information-processing algorithms, scientific
discoveries, naturally occurring items, mental steps, and printed
matter.113 These limiting doctrines are described briefly in this section
with emphasis on how the doctrines may relate to the patentability of
intangible inventions.
1. Algorithms
Algorithms-sequences of steps for handling information, usually
to solve a particular type of information analysis problem' 14 -are
109. See id.
110. See id.
11. See Thomas, supra note 55, at 10.
112. "Perhaps realizing the expansive grasp of proprietization made possible
by the patent system, the courts developed sundry doctrines to cabin its reach."
Id.
113. The patent-limiting doctrines discussed here are by no means the only
such doctrines that courts have identified. One court offered the following list of
advances that are unpatentable: "principles, laws of nature, mental processes,
intellectual concepts, ideas, natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods
of calculation, fundamental truths, original causes, motives, [and] the
Pythagorean theorem." Bergy, 596 F.2d at 965.
114. In the view of the Federal Circuit court,
[t]he definition of "algorithm" is not universally agreed. One working
definition is that "[a]n algorithm is an unambiguous specification of a
conditional sequence of steps or operations for solving a class of
problems." Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The
ModelsAre Broken, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1986). The same
author notes that the label "mathematical algorithm" is a source of
confusion: "The first confusion is using involvement with numbers as
the hallmark for distinguishing mathematics from nonmathematics, as
an aid to determining what is an algorithm .... [M]athematics deals
with both nonnumerical things and numerical things.... [T]here are
both numerical and nonnumerical algorithms.... Therefore, any
attempt to find a helpful or cutting distinction between mathematics
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
unpatentable of themselves." 5  Courts have derived this rule from
several policies underlying patent law. 116
First, the treatment of algorithms is informed by the basic notion
that abstract ideas should not be patentable because such ideas are not
practical applications of themselves and thus do not achieve the type
of practical utility that the patent system was designed to further."
7
An algorithm, before it is applied to solve a particular practical
problem, is simply an idea about the relationship between input and
output information-that is, about the analytic steps that will
transform the input information into the output information." 8 The
mathematical calculations or information-processing steps--divorced
from any application in which they may have direct practical
importance-are too devoid of societal benefit to warrant patent
rewards. Until they are linked to a practical context, they lack the type
of useful results that patent laws are designed to further. To ensure
that patent enforcement costs-including costs due to restrictions on
public access to discoveries and transaction costs of patent
enforcement-are incurred only where society has received useful
benefits from patented inventions, patentable subject matter is
restricted to applied, useful inventions rather than just abstract ideas
that may lead to such inventions."
19
Mathematical formulas or definitions of mathematical
relationships are also unpatentable under this same rule. 120 These are
but specialized means for describing information relationships,
indicating how information of one form-i.e., that on one side of a
and nonmathematics, as between numerical or nonnumerical, is
doomed."
In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,293 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
115. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
116. See id.
117. See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
118. The relationship involved concerns the ability of the input information to
be transformed into a specified type of results or outputs by analyzing the input
information in accordance with the algorithm. In essence, this is an idea about
the equivalency, with the addition of some analytic effort, of the input and output
information.
119. "Though they may be represented by written formulae, symbols,
equations, or 'algorithms,' mathematical exercises remain disembodied. They
may not, therefore, cross the threshold of [patentable subject matter]." In re
Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
120. See id.
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mathematical equals sign--can be reliably transformed into another
form--the information on the other side of the equals sign.
121
Second, as an additional basis for withholding patents from newly
discovered algorithms, courts have recognized the need to keep
unapplied algorithms freely available for use in later intellectual and
engineering activities. Such basic truths or expressions of these
truths are excluded from patentability, in part, because they comprise
"the basic tools of scientific and technological work" which are too
important to technological progress to be allowed to be controlled by
one party. 1
23
Third, potentially important, but as yet unapplied algorithms are
also excluded from patentability to ensure that the lure of patent
rewards encourages inventors to combine these algorithms with
practical implementation details to produce applications based on the
algorithms. 124  Withholding patent rights until an algorithm is
translated into a practical application encourages the completion of the
inventive process to the point of specifying this sort of application. As
noted by leading patent commentator Donald Chisum:
Theoretical or abstract discoveries are excluded [from
patentable subject matter] as are discoveries, however
practical and useful, in nontechnological arts, such as the
liberal arts, the social sciences, theoretical mathematics, and
business and management methodology. This focus on
technology explains the preoccupation of patent law with
means. A patent can issue only for a new means of
achieving a useful end or result. Those who articulate new
problems or recognize new needs frequently make valuable
contributions to society but cannot look to the patent system
for reward unless they go on to find a new and specific
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
that solves the problem or meets the need.
125
The difficulty with the judicial doctrines excluding algorithms
and other abstract ideas from patentability lies in determining when an
abstract, unpatentable discovery is coupled with sufficient practical
121. See id. at 1336.
122. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68.
123. Id. at 67.
124. See id.
125. CHIsUM, supra note 1, § 1.01 (citations omitted).
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implementation details to create a useful, patentable invention.126 In
some design settings, specialized information handling algorithms
may lead to practical applications with little application design effort
beyond the specification or discovery of the algorithms. 127 In these
situations, discovery of the algorithms will be tantamount to discovery
of the application. Granting a patent for such an algorithm-based
invention may appear to give patent rewards for the discovery of the
abstract information-handling algorithm that made the invention
possible.
Until recently, federal courts assessed the patentability of
algorithm-based discoveries under what was called the Freeman-
Walter test for patentable subject matter. 128  This special test was
developed to identify patentable subject matter in advances that were
based in part on new information-processing methods. 129  This
standard arose out of the efforts by lower courts to understand and
give force to the Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson.
130
In Benson, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a new
information-processing method for translating one form of numerical
representation data into another was not patentable subject matter.
131
Unfortunately, the Court gave a somewhat incoherent explanation of
its holding, noting that the claimed invention involved a
"mathematical algorithm" and that the issuance of the patent sought
would improperly preempt usage of that algorithm. 32
Because the Court provided very little guidance about how to
identify software advances that incorporated algorithms in the manner
found objectionable under Benson, the Benson decision created serious
problems for lower federal courts as they reviewed software-based
patents and other patents addressing information-processing
126. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[1][f][v].
127. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing a new method for online
purchasing in which a new information-processing algorithm enabled a single
computer-mouse click to be used to purchase an item).
128. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also
CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[1][f][iv] (discussing the Freeman-
Walter test).
129. See Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1374.
130. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
131. Seeid. at71.
132. See ChISUM & JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[1][f][ii] (describing the
uncertainty created by the Supreme Court's analysis in Benson).
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advances. 133 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)
responded by fashioning a software patentability standard that was
consistent with the Benson decision, but which (at least in theory)
applied special patentability standards only to a narrow range of
software advances. 134  The C.C.P.A.'s aim was to specify special
patentability tests only for the specific types of algorithm-based
advances which were of concern in Benson, leaving further types of
software-based inventions subject to the regular patentability standards
applied to other sorts of technological advances.' 35 The result was the
Freeman-Walter test for software patentability, a special patentable
subject matter test for software advances involving applications of
mathematical algorithms. 1
36
The Freeman-Walter test was comprised of two parts. 137 The
first part of the Freeman-Walter test examined whether an invention
involved an application of a mathematical algorithm. 38 If so, the
133. See id. § 2C[1][f][iv] (describing the origins of the Freeman-Walter test).
134. See id.; 1 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW 3A-14.7 (2001).
135. See BENDER, supra note 134, at 3A-15; CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note
21, § 2C[1][f][iv].
136. See CISUM & JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[1][f][v].
137. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053,
1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In its 1981 Guidelines addressing software patentability standards, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office described the Freeman-Walter test as
follows:
[E]ach method or apparatus claim must be analyzed to determine
whether a mathematical algorithm is either "directly" or "indirectly"
recited. If the claim at issue fails to directly recite a mathematical
algorithm, reference must be made to the specification in order to
determine whether claim language indirectly recites mathematical
calculations, formulas, or equations.
If a given claim directly or indirectly recites a mathematical
algorithm, the second step of the analysis must be applied. Under this
step, a determination must be made as to whether the claim as a
whole, including all its steps or apparatus elements, merely recites a
mathematical algorithm, or method of calculation. If so the claim
does not recite statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Rick D. Nydegger, Traversing the Section 112, Paragraph Six Field of Land
Mines: Does In re Donaldson Adequately Defuse the Problems (Part 1), 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 947, 965-66 (1994) (quoting U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Patentable Subject Matter-Mathematical Algorithms or
Computer Programs, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2110 (4th
ed. 1979, rev. 1981)).
138. SeeArrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-59.
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second part determined whether granting patent restrictions on the use
of that invention would preempt all use of the algorithm.139 If the
answer to either question was no, the Freeman-Walter test indicated
that the invention was patentable subject matter and that a patent
should issue if other tests for patentability (e.g., novelty, non-
obviousness, etc.) were met.
140
The second part of the Freeman-Walter test was deemed not to be
satisfied (meaning that the invention under review involved patentable
subject matter) if the claimed invention used a mathematical algorithm
to calculate or determine information that was relied on in some
further fashion to redefine the structure of the invention.' 4 1 That is,
the second step of the Freeman-Walter test was interpreted in a way
that found patentable subject matter in an algorithm-based invention if
information processing in accordance with the algorithm was used in
some functionally significant way to redefine the physical attributes or
operations of the invention.
142
The two parts of the Freeman-Walter test served different
functions. The first part served as a screening test for determining if
the detailed analyses of the second step were necessary. 143 These
further analyses were needed if a claimed advance involved the type of
invention which raised special concerns in Benson-i.e., an advance
based on a mathematical algorithm.144
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. In In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), the court described the
application of the second Freeman-Walter step as follows:
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole
must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical
algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural
relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus
claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the claim
being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101. If,
however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented and solved
by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and Flook, and is
not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no
amount of post-solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor is
it saved by a preamble merely reciting the field of use of the
mathematical algorithm.
Id. at 767 (citations omitted).
142. See id.
143. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-59.
144. See id.
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The second part constituted the heart of the standard. It assessed
whether a mathematical algorithm recited in a patent claim was
described as no more than a disembodied calculation or was rather
described in combination with other invention elements in such a way
that the algorithm had functional significance. 145 This was the case if
information processing in accordance with the algorithm was used to
dictate structural features or operational restrictions incorporated in the
invention.' 46 In essence, this second step in the Freeman-Walter test
examined whether the patent claim addressed a practical application of
a mathematical algorithm because information processing was being
used to define some useful or desirable feature of the claimed
invention. To resolve this question, courts were forced to consider
ways in which abstract information-processing procedures could be
translated into useful advances. 1
47
As will be discussed below, the overall Freeman-Walter test has
been rejected in recent court decisions.148 However, current patentable
subject matter standards still turn on whether assertedly patentable
advances produce certain types of practically useful results. 149 The
second portion of the Freeman-Walter test may still be helpful in
evaluating the practical contents of information-processing based
inventions. This portion of the Freeman-Walter test, focusing on the
elements needed in a practical application beyond just an information-
processing algorithm, may be useful in interpreting advances based on
information-processing methods and in identifying those advances
with sufficient practical features to constitute patentable subject
matter.
During the years they used the Freeman-Walter test, courts often
applied the test unevenly. There were several reasons why the
Freeman-Walter test was difficult to apply consistently. First, courts
adopted varying notions of what constituted a "mathematical
algorithm" for purposes of the first part of the test.15 Where a narrow
145. See Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See discussion infra at notes 164-68.
149. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(holding that a new device constitutes patentable subject matter if the device is a
specific machine that produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result').
150. Compare In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (treating
"mathematical algorithms" as a subset of mental processes or mental process
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view of mathematical algorithms was applied, inventions were easily
found not to involve algorithms and, hence, to be outside the special
patentability limitations imposed by the Freeman-Walter test.151 By
adopting narrow interpretations of the first "gatekeeper" step of the
Freeman-Walter test, courts supporting broad views of software
patentability had a means to find patentable subject matter in many
software patent applications. 152 However, no clear test for identifying
algorithm-based software was ever developed, and detailed analyses
under the second part of the Freeman-Walter test were undertaken
haphazardly.
153
Courts also varied widely in their views about the types of patent
claims that would preempt the use of a mathematical algorithm and
thereby render the claims improper under the second part of the
Freeman-Walter test. 154 Courts generally agreed that patent claims
directed towards the use of algorithms in narrowly defined contexts
would not preempt all use of the same algorithms.155 For example,
equivalents for purposes of applying the Freeman-Walter test), with In re Toma,
575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (treating "mathematical algorithms" as only
those sequences based on a formula or equation), and In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237, 1246 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (same).
151. See, e.g., Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245-46.
152. Varying views on the scope of "mathematical algorithms" within the
meaning of the Freeman-Walter test often dictated the outcome of patent
litigation. For example, this type of difference in threshold standards and
resulting differences in software evaluations was present in Toma. The patent at
issue in this case involved a sequence of information processing to accomplish
natural language translation. See Toma, 575 F.2d at 874. The patent office
found that this invention met the first prong of the Freeman-Walter test because
a form of information-processing algorithm was involved. See id. at 876.
However, on appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) held
that the first prong of the Freeman-Walter test was not satisfied because there
was no algorithm involved in the invention. See id. at 876-77. In applying this
test, the C.C.P.A. was searching for a mathematical algorithm-that is, a formula
or equation-per se. Finding none in the claimed invention, the court simply
concluded that problems sought to be addressed by the Freeman-Walter test
were not present in the patent under scrutiny. See id. Consequently, the court
concluded that patentable subject matter was present. See id. at 877-78.
153. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025, 1075-76 (1990) (discussing judicial application of the first
prong of the Freeman-Walter test).
154. See Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795 n.2 (noting that the second step of the
Freeman-Walter test was subject to "misinterpretation").
155. See, e.g., Walter, 618 F.2d at 765.
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patents which only claimed control over the use of an information-
processing algorithm to achieve a particular physical result or a
particular restriction on the operation of a device or process were
viewed as being addressed to patentable subject matter because these
patents could be enforced without constraining all use of the algorithm
involved. 156 Because they would not impose the broad preemption of
algorithm use that was of concern in Benson, these sorts of narrowly
drafted claims linking the use of an algorithm to specified physical
results or effects were held to describe patentable subject matter under
the second portion of the Freeman-Walter test.157 Unfortunately, this
is where the agreement of most courts ended. There was little
agreement on how limitations on algorithm use should be framed to
claim patentable subject matter in an information-processing advance
having no physical results or impacts. 1
58
Some progress was made in identifying types of information-
processing patent claims that were not sufficient-i.e., that did not
state patentable subject matter. These negative rules regarding
patentable subject matter mostly arose out of controversies involving
software-based inventions. 159 Certain types of physical invention
features included in patent claims were deemed not to be sufficiently
limiting and were simply ignored in analyses of those claims. For
example, a field of use restriction on the employment of a
mathematical algorithm-that is, a limitation of the use of an
algorithm to analyses in a particular field such as geology or
acoustics-was deemed to be an insufficient restriction to narrow the
claimed use of the algorithm to patentable subject matter.' 6 ° Likewise,
restrictions requiring the use of an algorithm in conjunction with a
specific data input or output method were deemed to be insubstantial
limitations that would not restrict algorithm-based patent claims to a
156. See id. at 767 (applying the second prong of the Freeman-Walter test, the
court determined that patentable subject matter is present if a "mathematical
algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships
between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or
limit claim steps (in process claims)").
157. See id.
158. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 906-07 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (describing
sources of uncertainty in applying the second prong of the Freeman-Walter test).
159. See, e.g., In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re de
Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
160. See Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
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particular application or physical setting. 161 Hence, these types of
restrictions in patent claims covering software implementations of new
algorithms were not deemed to be sufficiently narrow and specific to
define patentable software applications under the Freeman-Walter
test. 16  However, the nature of claim restrictions that would be
sufficiently narrow under the test was never completely resolved,
resulting in inconsistent patterns of holdings that particular claims did
or did not preempt the use of software-implemented mathematical
algorithms.
163
Finally, in State Street Bank & Trust Co.,164 the Federal Circuit
court explicitly rejected the Freeman-Walter standard as a test for
identifying patentable subject matter in information-processing
inventions. The court explained this rejection as follows:
After Diehr[165l and Chakrabarty,[166 the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the
presence of statutory subject matter. As we pointed out in
Alappat,(1671 application of the test could be misleading,
because a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter employing a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
161. In In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982), the court concluded that
certain physical features of an invention should be ignored in determining if a
mathematical algorithn used as part of the invention had a sufficiently functional
role in dictating the structure of the invention to make the overall invention
patentable subject matter. The court observed that: (1) "mere antecedent data
gathering steps do not render the claims statutory"; (2) "mere reference to
apparatus does not render a claim statutory"; and (3) "reading out the results of
calculations does not render the claim statutory." Id. at 796 n.4 (citations
omitted).
162. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (analyzing data output
steps); Walter, 618 F.2d at 767 (analyzing field of use restrictions); Richman,
563 F.2d at 1026 (analyzing data gathering steps).
163. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (finding patent
claims to a method for reformatting numerical representations to preempt
further use of the information-processing algorithm involved; invention held
not to be patentable subject matter); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(finding patent claims to a method of natural language translation not to
preempt further use of the algorithm involved; invention held to be patentable
subject matter).
164. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
165. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
166. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
167. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543.
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abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though a law
of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea would not,
by itself, be entitled to such protection. The test determines
the presence of, for example, an algorithm. Under Benson,
this may have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory
subject matter. However, after Diehr and Alappat, the mere
fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers,
calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing
numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory
subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does not
produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result." After all,
as we have repeatedly stated,
every step-by-step process, be it electronic or chemical
or mechanical, involves an algorithm in the broad sense
of the term. Since § 101 expressly includes processes
as a category of inventions which may be patented and
§ 100(b) further defines the word "process" as meaning
"process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material," it follows that it is no ground for
holding a claim is directed to nonstatutory subject
matter to say it includes or is directed to an algorithm.
This is why the proscription against patenting has been
limited to mathematical algorithms .... 168
However, even after its rejection of the overall Freeman-Walter
test, the Federal Circuit court has indicated that the presence of
patentable subject matter in a claimed invention turns on functional
operations and results that distinguish the invention from a discovery
of abstract knowledge. 69 The analyses of the structural implications
of mathematical algorithms that courts formerly used as part of their
evaluations of the second step of the Freeman-Walter test may
continue to be helpful in current inquiries regarding patentable subject
matter. Types of inventions that were considered to have sufficiently
important structural interactions to establish patentable subject matter
under the second step of the Freeman-Walter test will probably also be
168. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1374-75 (quoting Iwahashi, 888
F.2d at 1374.).
169. See State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1375.
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seen as having sufficiently functional and structurally implemented
features to constitute applications with useful, concrete and tangible
results.170 With these sorts of results, the inventions will be patentable
subject matter under current standards. 7'
For example, the Federal Circuit court's analysis of the second
step of the Freeman-Walter test in Arrhythmia Research Technology,
Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.172 provides a good illustration of how similar
analyses may proceed under current standards. Portions of the
patent at issue in that case covered a method for analyzing
electrocardiographic signals to provide information about certain
human heart conditions and a computer apparatus for implementing
the method.173
Addressing the claimed method, the court assumed that the
method involved a mathematical algorithm. 174 The court went on to
apply the second step of the Freeman-Walter test and found a
sufficient application of the mathematical algorithm to establish
patentable subject matter in the overall method. 175  The court
explained that the claimed invention entailed "'converting',
'applying', 'determining', and 'comparing' . . . steps that
transform[ed] one physical, electrical signal into another."'176 The
resulting signal defined an output that "[was] not an abstract number,
but [was] a signal related to the patient's heart activity.' 177 In short
the court held that a new type of information processing used to
produce data with practical significance was patentable subject
matter.1
78
The court also found statutory subject matter in the claimed
apparatus because the mathematical features of the claimed apparatus
design were used to program the computer involved in a new way.
179
The apparatus claims "define[d] 'a combination of interrelated means'
for performing specified functions.... The computer-performed
170. SeeArrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-60.
171. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
172. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
173. See id. at 1059-61.
174. See id. at 1058-59.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 1059.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1060.
179. See id. at 1053-54.
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operations transform[ed] a particular input signal to a different output
signal, in accordance with the internal structure of the computer as
configured by electronic instructions.
180
These two portions of the court's analysis indicate how a new,
intangible information-processing method may be used to create
patentable subject matter under current standards. First, as with the
method successfully claimed in Arrhythmia, an analytic method will
be patentable subject matter if the method is used to evaluate data or
information with physical significance or relevance, giving the result a
further physical significance and practical utility. 81 Second, a new
analytic approach can be used to direct and organize the programming
of a computer. 182 Used this way, the new method of information
processing defines a new sequence or structure of analytic steps
performed by the computer and, with this new manner of operation, a
potentially patentable new machine design.
This analysis clarifies how a single information-processing
advance may produce two types of patentable subject matter: a
patentable process for using the new advance to produce physically
significant data-processing results and a patentable device in the form
of a general purpose computer specially configured to process data in
accordance with the new advance but not necessarily applied to any
particular physical task.
The analysis in Arrhythmia suggests a general framework for
recognizing patentable subject matter in intangible inventions.
Patentable subject matter should be found where intangible rules or
relationships are used to analyze physically significant information
(with or without a computer) or to define equivalent information-
processing steps undertaken by a computer or other information-
processing device. Applied across a variety of application domains,
these two types of intangible but patentable advances may include a
wide range of computer-processing and information-processing
applications. The breadth of patentable information-processing
advances that this standard encompasses suggests there may be a
correspondingly broad role for patents in promoting computer
software innovations and in controlling subsequent computer
applications.
180. Id. at 1060 (citation omitted).
181. See id. at 1059.
182. See id. at 1057.
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These and other impacts of the approach used in Arrhythmia will
be revisited in later portions of this Article describing a proposed
standard for identifying patentable subject matter in intangible
inventions.1 83 Ultimately, the proper test for patentable subject matter
in intangible inventions must include an articulated principle for
balancing the patent controls given to inventors as rewards for
applying intangible information-processing algorithms to specific
tasks and the public's interest in unrestricted access to information-
processing algorithms that can be used beneficially in many applied
contexts.
2. Scientific discoveries
Scientific discoveries are unpatentable. 184 This is true even for
scientific discoveries of fundamental importance such as Einstein's
famous discovery that energy and mass adhere to the relationship
described by the formula E=MC. 185 Scientific discoveries such as
this may be descriptions of widely encountered natural phenomena or
relationships between such phenomena, but they are not useful,
practically significant knowledge of themselves. 186 Whatever their
descriptive importance, these discoveries lack the immediate practical
benefit to society required of a patentable invention.
Of course, the addition of practical implementation details to
newly discovered scientific knowledge can produce a patentable
invention.187 Courts have long recognized that "[w]hile a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not [a] patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be.',
188
The difficulty in distinguishing raw, unpatentable scientific
discoveries from further patentable applications of those discoveries is
similar to the problem surrounding the patenting of information-
processing inventions. For both scientific discoveries and
information-processing methods, it is difficult to define in general
terms the types of practical elements that will bring a new discovery
183. See discussion infra Part IV.
184. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
185. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
186. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68.
187. See id. at 69-70.
188. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,94 (1939).
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out of the abstract realm into the domain of a practical application.
These minimum application elements are the focus of later discussions
in this Article.
189
3. Naturally occurring items
Plants, animals and processes occurring in nature are not
patentable even when they are newly discovered and brought to public
attention. 190 The reason for this is that the discovery of these
preexisting items does not involve the development and specification
of any artificial, human-created construct of the sort that the patent
system is designed to encourage and reward.' 91 In short, a person who
goes into a natural setting and brings to public knowledge a
preexisting plant or animal has made the wrong sort of discovery for
patenting. Such a person has provided the public with a better
description of a preexisting item, but the person has not constructed a
new item of the sort that courts will treat as an "invention."' 192 Absent
such an invention, there is nothing to patent. The practical effect of
this rule is that no person can use the patent system to control the
propagation or replication of naturally occurring plants, animals, and
processes, even ones that are recently discovered.
However, the patent system does support controls over newly
developed uses of plants or animals. 193  Such a new use may be
developed in conjunction with the discovery of a plant or animal in
nature. If a person develops a new use for a previously unknown plant
or animal, this new use may be patentable as an invented process.194 if
189. See discussion infra Part V.B.
190. See, e.g., Sarkar, 588 F.2d at 1333 ("Though every set of steps, of
whatever nature, may properly be labeled a 'process,' § 101 ... limits the patent
system to invented processes.").
191. "Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be
well known, an inventive application of the [process] may be patented.
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent
[without]... some other inventive concept in its application." Id. at 1335-36
(quoting Parker, 437 U.S. at 594.).
192. "Sets of steps conducted entirely by nature are not subject to patenting;
they are not invented by man." Sarkar, 588 F.2d at 1333.
193. See, e.g., In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1294 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (noting
that a method of using natural materials may be patentable even though the
natural starting material is unprotectable).
194. See id. (holding that the process of using a new antibiotic cultivated from
a newly found bacterium is clearly within 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, thus, is
patentable).
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a patent issues for the new process, the patent will control the use of
the plant or animal in the specified way, but will not limit other uses of
the plant or animal. 195 Similar protection may be obtained for newly
developed uses of plants or animals where the plants or animals
involved have been publicly known for some time. 9 6 This type of
patent protection will be available so long as the new use is not merely
an obvious extension or modification of the previously known uses of
the plant or animal.
197
In addition, the patent system will protect certain modified forms
of previously known animals or plants. 198  At least two types of
modifications of preexisting plants and animals have qualified for
patent protections. One sort of patentable material is produced by the
purification or isolation of naturally occurring materials to produce
forms of those materials that did not occur in nature.199 The presence
of new functionality in newly isolated or purified materials is often
sufficient evidence that the materials are patentable subject matter.200
A second type of modification of naturally occurring materials
that can produce patentable subject matter involves the use of
preexisting animals or plants to produce genetically modified
20versions. 01 The plants or animals that result from these genetic
engineering processes did not previously exist in nature and are
therefore patentable subject matter, at least where they can be shown
to be useful.20 2 Here, the newly engineered animal or plant is an
original life form with genetic differences from its predecessors.
These changes in genetic composition and interior features constitute
the structural differences needed to make these genetically engineered
plants and animals patentable subject matter.
20 3
195. See id.
196. See 35 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1994) (defining patentable subject matter as
including a "new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material").
197. See Mancy, 499 F.2d at 1290-94.
198. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1966).
199. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (upholding a patent for a purified and isolated DNA sequence).
200. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 531-32.
201. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that
live, human-made micro-organisms are patentable subject matter and can be
"manufactured").
202. See id. at 308-10.
203. See id. at 310 ("[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with
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Cases resolving questions about the patentability of modified
forms of naturally occurring items tend to focus on the extent of
physical differences between the modified items and their naturally
occurring counterparts and the functional significance of those
differences. 20 4 Because they emphasize physical differences as means
to distinguish patentable, modified life forms from unpatentable,
naturally occurring items, the analyses in these cases provide few
insights into how courts should evaluate the intangible features that are
needed to establish patentable subject matter in intangible inventions.
4. Mental steps
Analytic processes or other information-processing methods are
unpatentable if they involve no more than a series of mental steps or
information-processing steps that could be implemented through
mental processes.20 5  Federal courts have accepted this rule-
commonly referred to as the "mental steps doctrine"--for many
years.2 °6 The scope of the mental steps doctrine was considered in
detail in In re Prater. 207 In Prater, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.) described the mental steps doctrine as a narrow
rule that only precludes patents which interfere with the free use of
mental processes. 20 8 Seen this way, the mental steps doctrine only
affects the patentability of information-processing sequences standing
alone. That is, the mental steps doctrine applies only if patent
protection is sought for an information-processing sequence such that
a mental process incorporating the same information-processing
sequence would fall within the patent and be restricted. -9
Several explanations have been offered for the mental steps
doctrine. One concern addressed by the mental steps doctrine is
that mental activities and associated human communication,
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the
potential for significant utility.").
204. See id.
205. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
206. See id.
207. 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-89 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (tracing the development of the doctrine).
208. Specifically, the court held that the doctrine only precludes patents for
those processes that can be performed in the human mind without the aid or
involvement of further equipment. See id. at 1389.
209. See id.
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understanding, and creativity should not be limited by patent
constraints.210 The mental steps doctrine ensures that mental steps,
standing alone, cannot infringe a patent because patents purporting to
cover such processes are void and unenforceable. 211 This view of the
mental steps doctrine suggests that the doctrine may apply to some
patents purporting to cover information-processing methods that could
be implemented by either mental steps or computer processing since
these patents could conceivably restrict mental processes. However,
the best means to avoid a conflict between these sorts of patents on
information-processing advances and free pursuit of mental activity
may be to adopt patent infringement standards that treat all mental
activities as noninfinging per se.212 This approach would retain
patent limitations on computer applications and other electronic
implementations of patented information-processing inventions, but
would leave mental steps of all types free from patent limitations.
This adjustment of infringement standards is a preferable means of
protecting mental processes from patent interference in comparison
with the more drastic method of excluding information processes from
patentable subject matter generally through a broad application of the
mental steps doctrine.
A second view is that discoveries of disembodied processes such
as mental steps are unpatentable because sequences of mental steps
(and equivalent information processing accomplished in machines
rather than mental processes) lack the physical manipulations or
results that are required in a patentable invention.213 For example, in
210. See Meyer, 688 F.2d at 796 (rejecting a patent on a computer system on
the ground that the patent sought protection for "a mathematical algorithm
representing a mental process that has not been applied to physical elements or
process steps"); see also Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1118 (noting that the
holding in Meyer demonstrated that "the CCPA would not accept a patent for an
innovation which was 'concerned with replacing, in part, the thinking processes
of a neurologist with a computer"').
211. See Meyer, 688 F.2d at 794-95.
212. The scope and implications of this sort of adjustment of infringement
standards are addressed at a later point in this Article. See discussion infra Part
VI.C.
213. "Sets of steps occurring only in the mind have not been made subject to
patenting because mental processes are but disembodied thoughts, whereas
inventions which Congress is constitutionally empowered to make patentable are
tangible embodiments of ideas in the useful, or technological, arts." Sarkar, 588
F.2d at 1333.
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Exparte Read,214 the Patent Office Board of Patent Appeals relied on
the mental steps doctrine in rejecting a patent covering a method of
determining the speed or distance traveled by an aircraft. 5  The
Board concluded that a patentable method was not present because the
claims at issue failed to describe "any true manipulative steps, except
the moving of one scale relative to the other."216 The act of reading an
instrument was seen as "purely a mental act that can not be regarded
as a true manipulative step. 217
The continued validity of this rationale for the mental steps
doctrine is doubtful in light of recent judicial decisions holding that
physical manipulations or results are not required in patentable
inventions. 218 A process such as the one at issue in Read, which is
essentially an information-processing method once the process's
inconsequential physical elements are stripped away and ignored, will
constitute patentable subject matter under present standards because
the information being processed corresponds to a particular external
object being measured or analyzed. For example, in State Street Bank
& Trust Co.,2 19 the Federal Circuit court found patentable subject
matter in a disembodied process involving the manipulation of
information about the dollar amounts of deposits in financial
accounts. 22 Even though the means involved in this manipulation of
information (computer processing through circuits and signals having
unspecified physical structures)221 and the immediate ends (computer
records with unspecified structures) were intangible,222 patentable
subject matter was present because the invention involved practical,
useful results-i.e., accounting results useful in the control of funds.223
214. 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 446 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1943).
215. Seeid. at 447.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that patentable subject matter was present in a
new electronic record-keeping system for information on long distance calls);
State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1369 (holding that patentable subject
matter was present in a new data-processing system used in investment
management).
219. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
220. See id. at 1370.
221. See id. at 1373.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1373, 1375.
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In light of this type of holding, the impact of the mental steps doctrine
may be limited to abstract analyses of information having no direct
linkage to a particular practical application. The presence or absence
of physical manipulations or results no longer seems indicative of
patentable subject matter.
A third explanation of the mental steps doctrine may have greater
current validity. Rejections of patents involving mental steps may
reflect concerns over the imprecision or irreproducibility of
discretionary components of claimed inventions.224 Under this view,
processes involving certain mental steps are unpatentable because,
although they produce practical results, they do so through partially
specified exercises of individual judgment or decision making.22 5 "A
patent may not properly issue for a method dependent upon the
aesthetic, emotional, or normative reactions of a human actor."
226
When applied this way to render unpatentable certain discoveries
which turn on imperfectly reproducible discretion or judgment, the
mental steps doctrine serves to ensure that patent restrictions generally
attach only to inventions involving transferable, widely replicable
utility.
As will be discussed at a later point in this Article, replicable
utility is probably an essential feature of patentable subject matter
generally.227 If the mental steps doctrine is viewed as an indirect
means to limit patented inventions to advances involving regularly
operative, objectively defined features and replicable utility, then this
doctrine points towards a valuable and important threshold feature of
patentable subject matter in both intangible inventions and other types
of advances.
5. Printed matter
Expressive content recorded in printed matter-and, by analogy,
expressive content preserved in any other recording material-
generally is not patentable. 2 8 Printed matter that does no more than
224. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
225. See id.
226. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 1.03.
227. See discussion infra Part V.C.
228. See, e.g., In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (holding that a
pictorial method of writing sheet music was not patentable); In re Russell, 48
F.2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding that a method of arranging directories in a
phonetic order was not patentable); Boggs v. Robertson, 13 U.S.P.Q. 214 (D.C.
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record text is not patentable because, although it may record new,
useful information or otherwise convey useful or desirable contents,
the printed matter does not serve a functional role except as an
information recording medium.229 This role is not innovative even
though the recorded contents may change. 30 While specific words or
means of communication used in new printed matter may gain some
protection against copying under copyright laws,231 the process of
printing information to record or convey it involves no new functional
structures and activities and, hence, no patentable invention. In short,
where new content is recorded in printed matter, no patentable
invention is created because the novelty and utility of the newly
created printed matter rest in features other than the structure or
functional attributes of the entity created.232
Cir. 1931) (holding that printed matter that merely reduced an abstract idea to
written form was not patentable). See generally Morton C. Jacobs, Note, The
Patentability of Printed Matter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
475 (1950) (discussing standards for identifying the patentable and non-
patentable aspects of printed matter).
229. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996); see also Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1036-37
(arguing that a basis exists in patent law for denying patents for these types of
computer program algorithms and related computer program inventions).
230. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7484; Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1035-36.
231. See Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1037 n.36.
Underlying the "printed matter" rule may be a perception that printed
matter is among the set of things that are "writings" protectible [sic]
by copyright law, not inventions in the "useful arts," and that
copyright law strikes the appropriate balance between protection of
expression and nonprotection of ideas for written texts. This balance
would be disrupted if patents were available based on the content of
the "printed matter." When "printed matter" has been patented, it has
generally been in situations in which it has been integrated into some
machine or physical structure which then supports the patent.
Id.
232. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 1.02. The fact that a book or other writing
is about a technological subject does not make the book a technological advance.
As Pamela Samuelson has noted:
One reason for the "printed matter" rule may be a perception that
although printing itself is a manufacturing process and part of the
technological arts, the printed matter itself-and its contents, in
particular-are not "in the technological arts," even when about the
technological arts. A book describing how to organize one's work
force in a rubber curing plant most effectively might be the product of
a manufacturing process (Le., the book) and it might be about a
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This general rule regarding the unpatentability of printed matter is
subject to an important exception covering functionally significant
printed materials. 3 3 This exception recognizes that some printed or
recorded materials contain both functionally significant structures and
recorded information.234 The involvement of functionally significant
structures in these materials makes them patentable subject matter.235
As one leading commentator explains:
"[P]rinted matter" by itself does not constitute a
"manufacture" and is not within the statutory classes of
patentable subject matter. As an exception to this rule,
printed matter may constitute an element of a patentable
claim if the claim involves a new and useful feature of
physical structure or a new and useful relation between the
printed matter and the physical structure. The courts admit
that the line between the rule and the exception is
frequently difficult to draw.
236
In considering what sorts of functional features will lift printed
matter innovations into the category of patentable advances, courts
focused on a number of relationships between the physical features of
printed works and the functional features of those works.237 The rule
that has emerged from these judicial analyses is that if the shape or
form of printed material or the location of matter printed on it has
functional implications in enhancing or limiting the use of the
material, then a sufficient functional structure for patenting is present
in the printed matter.
238
The roots of this rule extend back many years. For example, in
Benjamin Menu Card Co. v. Rand McNally & Co.,239 decided in
1894, a district court considered the patentability of a "combined
manufacturing process, but the content of the work would still not be
the kind of manufacture or process traditionally considered to be
patentable.
Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1037 n.36.
233. See Jacobs, supra note 228, at 477.
234. See id. at 478.
235. See Samuelson, supra note 153, at 1048, n.70.
236. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 1.02(4) (citations omitted).
237. See id.
238. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7478-80.
239. 210 F. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
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menu and meal check" which was developed to prevent fraud by
railroad employees in dining car operations.2 Prior to the
development of the new checks, the practice was to sell meal tickets
for dining car meals in book form with a check for the waiter, one for
the cook and one for the conductor.24 1 The three copies would be
turned into the company to prevent an employee from reselling a ticket
and pocketing the proceeds.242 However, employees could still
accomplish fraudulent sales if all three types of employees worked in
collusion.2 43  The newly developed menu scheme required further
participation by the customer in the fraud since the detachment of the
checks "mutilated" the menu and made it "useless for another
guest."
244
The district court in this case held that the combined menu and
meal ticket was patentable despite the fact that this invention involved
a specialized form of printed matter.2 45 The court found a sufficient
functional structure in these materials due to the functional
implications of the mutilation of the materials in their intended use.
246
The presence of printed matter on the menus and meal tickets, in
addition to their functionally significant structure, did not detract from
the patentability of the combination. As the court noted, "[t]he fact
that the structure may be of cardboard with printed matter upon it does
not exclude the device from patentability .... ,
247
A similar analysis was applied in Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Pope.248 The patent at issue in this case covered a new type of transfer
ticket for street railways.2 49 The new ticket was designed to reduce a
particular type of fraudulent practice plaguing the railways.250 Prior to
the adoption of the new ticket, conductors issued a transfer to a
morning passenger and punched an afternoon time, thereby allowing
240. Id. at 286.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 288.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 286.
248. 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913).
249. See id. at 444.
250. See id.
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
the customer to use the transfer instead of paying a return fare.251 The
new ticket contained a detachable coupon.252 A "morning" transfer
was issued with the coupon detached; an "afternoon!' transfer was
issued with the coupon attached. 3  The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found this ticket design to be patentable subject matter
because of the functional implications of the ticket's distinctive
physical structure.25 4 The court explained its reasoning as follows:
The device of the patent clearly involves physical structure.
The claims themselves are, in a proper sense, limited to
such structure.... [T]he alleged patentable novelty does
not reside in the arrangement of the printed text, nor does
such text constitute merely a printed agreement .... The
specifications do not confine the construction to either the
style, or printed arrangement or language of the legends.
255
In In re Lowry,256 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
considered the impact of the printed matter doctrine on an intangible
data-recording invention. 5 7 The patent application involved in this
case covered a novel data structure for storing, using, and managing
information in a computer memory.258 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) sought to reject this patent application, in
part because the application covered patterns of data storage in a
computer memory.259  The PTO argued that such data storage
innovations were equivalent to unpatentable recordings of information
in printed matter.2 0 Consequently, in the PTO's view, the claimed
data storage patterns should be treated as unpatentable information
recordings rather than functionally significant innovations.
2 61
Rejecting this analogy, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found the printed matter doctrine inapplicable because the
claimed data structure had functional implications in improving the
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 448.
254. Id. at 450.
255. Id. at 446-47.
256. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
257. See id. at 1580.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1582-83.
260. See id.
261. See id.
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operation of computers in which the structure was used.262 The court
explained its conclusion as follows:
[T]he data structures [claimed by Lowry are not] analogous
to printed matter. Lowry's [data structures] do not
represent merely underlying data in a database. [These
structures] contain both information used by application
programs and information regarding their physical
interrelationships within a memory. Lowry's claims dictate
how application programs manage information. Thus,
Lowry's claims define functional characteristics of the
memory.
Contrary to the PTO's assertion, Lowry does not claim
merely the information content of a memory. Lowry's data
structures, while including data resident in a database,
depend only functionally on information content. While the
information content affects the exact sequence of bits stored
in accordance with Lowry's data structures, the claims
require specific electronic structural elements which impart
a physical organization on the information stored in
memory....
Indeed, Lowry does not seek to patent the [claimed] data
model in the abstract. Nor does he seek to patent the
content of information resident in a database. Rather, [his]
data structures impose a physical organization on the data.
In Lowry's invention, the stored data adopt no physical
"structure" per se. Rather, the stored data exist as a
collection of bits having information about relationships
between the [data elements]. Yet this is the essence of
electronic structure. In Bernhart, this court's predecessor
noted:
There is one further rationale used by both the board
and the examiner, namely, that the provision of new
signals to be stored by the computer does not make it a
new machine, i.e. it is structurally the same, no matter
how new, useful and unobvious the result.... To this
question we say that if a machine is programmed in a
262. See id. at 1583-84.
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certain new and unobvious way, it is physically
different from the machine without that program; its
memory elements are differently arranged. The fact
that these physical changes are invisible to the eye
should not tempt us to conclude that the machine has
not been changed.
More than mere abstraction, the data structures are
specific electrical or magnetic structural elements in a
memory. According to Lowry, the data structures provide
tangible benefits: data stored in accordance with the
claimed data structures are more easily accessed, stored,
and erased. Lowry further notes that, unlike prior art data
structures, [his] data structures simultaneously represent
complex data accurately and enable powerful nested
operations.
263
Lowry is important because the court's analysis indicates how an
intangible invention can possess sufficient structure and linkage to an
outside physical context to be patentable.264 The court recognized that
the invention held patentable in Lowry was a specification of
intangible data formats..2 65  However, the court saw that the
arrangement of those formats implied a functional consequence in the
improved operation of computers programmed to handle data in the
new formats.266 This operational impact was sufficient to establish
that the data formats were functionally significant electronic
structures, rather than just recordings of information.
267
Lowry adopts the view that an intangible invention comprises
patentable subject matter where the invention includes information
formats, relationships, or sequences of relationships which are
functionally significant of themselves regardless of the particular
information content that is stored or processed with those formats,
relationships, or sequences of relationships.261 put another way, the
features of the intangible invention produce functional advantages
263. Id. at 1583-84 (citation omitted) (quoting In re Bernhart 417 F.2d 1395,
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
January 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
which disappear if the same data is recorded in a different format.
This indicates that the claimed format has a functional significance
that can be separated from its data recording contents.
Taken out of the computer context of Lowry, a separately
identifiable functionality that exists independent of the value of the
information being processed may be an essential attribute of all
patentable information-processing inventions. The mere fact that an
intangible process addresses information about an important subject
matter does not produce a patentable invention unless the process
achieves some new efficiency or effectiveness in handling that
information. 269 This new efficiency or effectiveness separates useful
information-processing techniques from mere data recording methods.
In sum, the court's analysis in Lowry and the patent case law on
printed matter generally suggest that to be patentable an information-
processing procedure should achieve an element of practical benefit or
utility above and beyond the utility of the input information used in the
procedure.27 ° The presence of identifiable, incremental utility in a
specific physical context where the procedure is used indicates that an
intangible invention has the proper utility for patenting. 271 This rule,
drawn from the concerns and case law surrounding the printed matter
doctrine, will form an important part of the standard for patentable
subject matter in intangible inventions developed later in this Article.
E. The PTO's Examination Guidelines
Although they are primarily directed to computer-related
inventions, the PTO's Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related
Inventions272 (Guidelines) outline the PTO's views concerning the
minimum features of patentable subject matter generally.273 Portions
of the Guidelines describe the characteristics that distinguish
computer-related processes constituting patentable subject matter from
269. See id.
270. See id.; see, e.g., In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1400.
271. See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1584.
272. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478 (Feb. 28, 1996).
273. See id. at 7481-82.
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unpatentable computer implementations of unapplied information-
processing sequences.274  In describing these distinguishing
characteristics in the context of computer-related processes, the PTO
reveals what it considers to be the generally applicable tests for
patentable subject matter under present case law. The PTO's
evaluation of the minimum features of patentable subject matter in
computer-related processes is as follows:
A [patent] claim that requires one or more acts to be
performed defines a process. However, not all processes
are statutory under § 101. To be statutory, a claimed
computer-related process must either: (1) [r]esult in a
physical transformation outside the computer for which a
practical application in the technological arts is either
disclosed in the specification or would have been known to
a skilled artisan... or (2) be limited by the language in the
claim to [a] practical application within the technological
arts .... The claimed practical application must be a
further limitation upon the claimed subject matter if the
process is confined to the internal operations of the
computer. If a physical transformation occurs outside the
computer, it is not necessary to claim the practical
application. A disclosure that permits a skilled artisan to
274. See id. at 7483-85. The guidelines also deal with patentable devices
incorporating computers. See id. at 7482-83. However, these devices, by virtue
of the physical structure supplied by their computer and non-computer contents,
are inherently tangible inventions. Hence, they do not raise the same sorts of
issues about the patentability of intangible inventions which are the focus of this
Article.
Computer-based processes, by contrast, do raise these issues. Such
processes may be little more than disembodied information-processing
sequences. Where these sequences are described in terms of computer
operations that do not achieve a practical, useful result, the sequences are nothing
more than disembodied information-processing ideas and patentable subject
matter should not be found. See id. at 7485-86.
The physical and functional features that must be present in a computer-
based process to transform it from an unpatentable processing idea into a
patentable invention provide useful examples of the types of features that may
distinguish abstract, unapplied subject matter from patentable applications
generally. See id. at 7483. Thus, the PTO's guidelines addressing the invention
features that are necessary for patenting computer-based processes provide
insights into the broader problem of the minimum content of patentable
inventions.
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practice the claimed invention, i.e., to put it to a practical
use, is sufficient. On the other hand, it is necessary to claim
the practical application if there is no physical
transformation or if the process merely manipulates
concepts or converts one set of numbers into another.
2 75
The patentable subject matter standards that the PTO is applying
to computer-related processes can be derived from this discussion.
These standards treat a physical transformation achieved under
information-processing control as sufficient but not necessary to
establish patentable subject matter. 6 The standards also specify that
some information-processing based advances lacking physical
transformations may constitute patentable subject matter if the
advances entail practical applications in the technological arts and the
patent rights sought in connection with the advances are limited in the
corresponding patent claims to specified practical applications.
277
This last requirement means that resulting patents will only restrict the
information-processing methods described in the patents when used in
the applications specified in the patent claims or in closely equivalent
applications. 278  Unfortunately, the Guidelines do not describe the
minimum features of a practical application of computer-implemented
information-processing methods, nor do they specify what will bring
an application within the "technological arts."
The PTO's standards concerning physically manipulative
inventions based on new information-processing methods are
consistent with prior court opinions that have considered physically
transformative features to be evidence of patentable subject matter.279
275. Id. at 7483.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 7484-85.
278. See id. at 7484.
279. It is clear that a process which produces a physical change or
"transformation" in an item is sufficient to constitute patentable subject matter.
As the Supreme Court observed as early as 1877:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of
machinery.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (quoted with approval in Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981)).
While the presence of a physical transformation as the result of the
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However, the Guidelines are seriously deficient in their failure to
provide more detailed standards for determining when patentable
subject matter is present in computer-related advances lacking
manipulations or transformations of physical items. Aside. from
noting the need for a stated application in the technological arts,280 the
Guidelines provide little useful instruction to examiners about how to
assess patentable subject matter in the important types of information-
processing advances that are the focus of this Article. Hence, these
Guidelines, like the case law on which they are based, fail to state
clear principles or criteria for distinguishing patentable and
unpatentable advances in information processing. The remainder of
this Article is aimed at defining these needed principles and criteria,
beginning with an evaluation of the characteristics of technological
knowledge and knowledge-transfer mechanisms and then shaping
proposed patentable subject matter standards for furthering the
development and dissemination of technological knowledge.
I. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF TECHNOLOGY
IN AN INFORMATION AGE
Like many judicial analyses before them, the PTO's Guidelines
adopt a patentable subject matter test which turns in part on whether a
discovery concerns an application within the technological arts.281
Under this test, the scope of technology and the technological arts
stake out the outer boundaries of patentable subject matter.28 2 To
understand these boundaries, then, it is necessary to understand the
scope of technology and the means-that is, the arts-used to apply
technology to useful designs and tasks.
completion of a process is sufficient to make the process patentable subject
matter, it is doubtful that such a transformation is necessary. Lower federal
courts have held that it is not. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding patentable subject matter
in a new electronic record-keeping format for information on long-distance
calls); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding patentable subject matter in a new data-processing
system used in investment management).
280. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7483.
281. Seeid. at7479.
282. See id.
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This section examines the distinctive features of technology and
the technological arts as they relate to the patent system. The section
begins with a review of features which a variety of commentators have
seen as distinguishing technological knowledge from other types of
knowledge. The section also examines the inadequacies of some
particular definitions of technology and offers suggestions for
avoiding similar deficiencies in our standards for patentable subject
matter.
A. Distinctive Features of the Technological Arts
1. Practical content
Technological knowledge is distinguishable from other types of
information or knowledge in that technological knowledge is directed
at furthering practical activities. Technology concerns "bodies of
skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using, and doing useful
things. '283 An element of technological knowledge will typically
involve specifications for a device, material, or procedure that can be
used to complete part or all of a practical task. In accomplishing this
task, the device, material, or procedure will have a corresponding
functionality that can be invoked again and again in a predictable
fashion.2 84 Users of the item or practice will be able to adopt it as a
useful implement or tool with predictable functional characteristics,
without necessarily appreciating the technological knowledge that
went into the development or production of the implement or tool.
While a new physical tool such as a new type of hammer is a
good example of technological innovation and design, 85 it is
important not to read too much into such examples. As efforts to
improve information-processing techniques have increased, broader
283. 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576
(David L. Sills ed., 1968).
284. Under a broadly inclusive view, technology may involve all things that
are undertaken in accordance with a "technical operation," where a technical
operation includes "every operation carried out in accordance with a certain
method in order to attain a particular end." JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 19 (John Wilkinson trans., Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
1964).
285. See id. at 3-10; see also MITCHAM, supra note 53, at 161-63 (discussing
various objects as forms of technology).
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notions of technological innovation have emerged.286 These broader
visions of technology treat certain information-processing techniques
as useful "tools" much like their physical counterparts.
287
Technological advances now encompass not only new designs for
physical items like new wrenches and drills, but also new designs for
intangible yet predictably useful information-processing methods.
This broader notion of technological design is a response to the
recognition that a wide range of useful discoveries-including many
new methods for computer processing of useful information-can
have the same sorts of reusable, useful characteristics present in new
physical tool designs. Hence, when considering new physical tools as
examples of technological design, it is helpful to remember the
reusability and usefulness of these tools and to forget the specific
physical characteristics of the tools that account for these features.
2. Artificial structure
A second important characteristic of technology is that it entails
an artificial structure imposed by human effort on an item or process
to increase the usefulness of that item or process. A wide range of
specific items-including materials, machines, and processes-can be
artificially assembled, shaped, or arranged to create the necessary
structure. Sometimes the combinations of elements that are ordered in
accordance with technological knowledge may be quite complex.
However, complexity is not the key, artificial-that is, human
created-content is. Some artificial device elements or processing
steps applied to achieve a practical effect or advantage must be present
in every technological design.288 Activities based on technological
knowledge involve the "application of scientific and other knowledge
to practical tasks by ordered systems that involve people and
organizations, living things and machines."
289
Entirely new items or processes need not be present in a
technological advance. Several types of artificial structures can be
added to or imposed upon preexisting materials, devices, or practices
286. See ELLUL, supra note 284, at 3-10.
287. See id.
288. See MITCHAM, supra note 53, at 168-69.
289. ARNOLD PACEY, THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 6 (1983) (emphasis in
original omitted).
January 2002] 415
416 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
to achieve practical results.290 Functionally important new structures
can be created by arranging new combinations of old elements,
establishing new relationships between previously combined elements,
or creating new sequences of relationships between previously related
elements. Sometimes new technological designs involve innovations
in several of these types of artificial structures. For example, a new
radio circuit design might involve assembling some previously used
radio parts in new locations on a circuit board (thereby establishing
new relationships between previously combined elements), and might
also include some electronic components previously used in other
electronic devices but not previously used in radio designs (thereby
producing a new combination of old elements).
Artificially created structures of these sorts distinguish
technological products from their component parts.291 Technological
innovation involves the accumulation of knowledge about these
artificially created structures, including how to implement the
structures and their functional capabilities and limitations. 92
Patent laws encourage inventors to develop and disclose artificial
structures for useful items or practices by withholding patent rewards
until functionally complete versions of these structures are understood
by the inventors and clearly described in patent applications. 293 Short
of this level of understanding and disclosure, the type of partial design
information that a patent applicant is able to give to the public is not
the sort of useful knowledge that merits a patent reward.
Consequently, disclosure demands of the patent laws encourage
inventors both to finish their development of complete artificial
structures for new inventions and to describe those structures
thoroughly in related patent applications. 9
290. See id.
291. See id. at 6-7.
292. See id.
293. An inventor must gain at least a working understanding of an invention to
be able to provide a sufficient description of the invention in a patent application.
The description of an invention in the specifications and drawings within a
patent application must provide sufficient information about the invention "to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same .... ." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
294. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7486 (Feb. 28, 1996).
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
3. Knowledge indexing or organization
A third distinguishing characteristic of technological knowledge
is that it is typically described and organized in relation to particular
295practical problems or applications. A given technological discovery
usually produces its full societal value, not from a single application in
a single instantiation of a device or procedure, but rather from the
discovery's repeated application as problems that the discovery can
address are encountered.296 This repeated application of technological
discoveries can be best accomplished through the organization, usage,
retrieval, and indexing of technological knowledge, not in terms of the
means by which the technology works, but rather in terms of the
context in which it works.
2 97
I refer to this as a method of "indexing" technological information
because the essential point is that a given type of technological
information must be known to relate to a given practical problem in
order for that knowledge to be applied regularly to solve the problem
and for the full measure of societal benefit to be gained from the
knowledge. Put another way, technological knowledge that is
overlooked when a problem that the knowledge could solve is
presented is little different than the absence of such knowledge.
Technological knowledge is valuable for what it can do. Hence, the
value of that knowledge turns on both its immediate usefulness when
applied and the frequency with which it is applied. Effectively
indexing technological knowledge to ensure that it is located and
applied when related problems are encountered can be highly
295. See MITCHAM, supra note 53, at 198.
296. Technological knowledge is frequently valuable in industrial settings
where repeated activities are common and the advantages of a technological
solution to a practical problem can be realized systematically over and over
again. However, technological processes and tools are not limited to industrial
contexts. Rather, they are present in diverse settings where parties undertake
recurrent activities. See MCGRAW-HILL CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 1954 (Sybil P. Parker ed., 4th ed. 1994) (stating that
technology involves "systematic knowledge and action, usually of industrial
processes but applicable to any recurrent activity").
297. See DANIEL BELL, THE WINDING PASSAGE: ESSAYS AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JOURNEYS 1960-1980, at 20 (1980) ("Technology is the instrumental ordering of
human experience within a logic of efficient means."); JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAiTH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12 (2d ed., rev. 1971) ("Technology
means the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to
practical tasks.").
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important in increasing the total societal gain from a technological
discovery. With such indexing and application, the practical value of
an element of technological knowledge can often be realized again and
again.
B. Avoiding Overly Narrow Definitions of the Technological Arts
Several commentators have advocated narrow definitions of
technology and the technological arts.298 This section describes these
narrow views of technology and argues that many of the limitations or
restrictions contained in these definitions are unwise. These
limitations and restrictions are criticized to explain why similar
limitations and restrictions should not be incorporated in patentable
subject matter standards.
1. Limiting technology to systematically
applied science and engineering
One commonly articulated view limits technology to
systematically applied science and engineering. For example, Jacob
Bigelow, in an 1831 text,2 99 described technology as involving "the
principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts,
particularly those which involve applications of science., 300  The
Patent Office used a similar definition of technology in a 1996
publication, defining it as "the 'application of science and engineering
to the development of machines and procedures in order to enhance or
improve human conditions, or at least to improve human efficiency in
some respect."' 30 1 Both of these definitions imply that technological
discoveries result from the systematic, rational application of
preexisting scientific or engineering principles to the solution of
practical problems.
While technological knowledge certainly encompasses practical
knowledge derived from the application of well-understood scientific
298. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7478, 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996); JACOB BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF
TECHNOLOGY, at v (2d ed. 1831).
299. See BIGELOW, supra note 298.
300. Id. at v.
301. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7488 (Feb. 28, 1996) (quoting COMPUTER DICTIONARY 384 (Microsoft
Press, 2d ed. 1994)).
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or engineering principles to practical problems, it is not limited to
knowledge that is gained in this manner. The view that technology is
the product of the systematic application of scientific or engineering
principles is overly restrictive in that it fails to address situations in
which luck or nonsystematic engineering know-how leads to useful
technological advances. These advances are not products of
preexisting endeavors or knowledge since the principles underlying
the advances are not fully understood when the advances are made.
Nonetheless, these sorts of partially understood, but practically
useful advances are undeniably technological in nature. As
summarized by one commentator:
Although some of the theoretical tools for engineering
design derive from science, many do not and some are even
problematic to the scientific community. In particular, the
set of idealized artifacts, technical skills and pragmatic
considerations indigenous to engineering practice have little
place in scientific endeavors. Technology is much more
than applied scientific knowledge, but is itself a distinct
form of knowledge.
30 2
Because a wider range of practical products and procedures are
brought to consumers, society has benefited from the development of
engineering and practical design disciplines which do not depend on
or wait for the prior development of underlying scientific or
engineering understanding. The functional attributes and advantages
of a technological advance may be specified by an inventor and used
to benefit society without the inventor having gained an understanding
of the advance's inner workings in scientific terms. "[It would be
ridiculous to suppose that invention has to wait humbly, cap in hand,
for science to open the door before it can proceed. Technology is
purposive and it tends.., to be positivist. The criterion is simply,
does it work?
30 3
302. Thomas, supra note 55, at 38.
303. DONALD CARDWELL, THE NORTON HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 492-93
(Roy Porter ed., 1995); see also Durham, supra note 51, at 1445 n.133 (noting
that American patent laws embrace this view of technology, permitting patents
for inventions that are functionally complete, but that have internal operations
which are not fully understood by their inventors; such discoveries are patentable
because an "[i]nvention without understanding is still a contribution to the
'useful arts"').
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2. Limiting technology to systematic physical manipulations
Additional commentators have asserted that physical
manipulations or transformations of the states of items are the
distinguishing features of technological advances.304 According to
Robert E. McGinn, technology involves "material product-making or
object-transforming activity. ' ,305 V. Gordon Childe has advocated a
similar definition, observing that "[t]echnology should mean the study
of those activities, directed to the satisfaction of human needs, which
produce alterations in the material world. ' ,316  Under this sort of
definition, technological knowledge concerns the
production or transformation of artifacts; interaction with
the external environment; systematic manipulation of
physical forces; and the presence of design. Technological
activities expend resources and knowledge in order to
fabricate or modify products, or to develop procedural
systems for so doing .... [T]echnology presents a form of
rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards
efficiency and capable of being assessed through objective
criteria.
30 7
The difficulty with this view of technology is that it ignores many
present fields of design in which highly useful innovations-
particularly innovations in computer-based information handling-are
intangible. Like their physical counterparts, the innovations emerging
from these new design fields achieve practical utility in a predictable
way such that numerous users can employ the innovations as tools.
Repeatable data handling steps in these innovations have predictable
and reliable utility like the utility found in physical tools. Given this
important functional similarity allowing data-processing advances to
be used as tools like their physical counterparts, standards which
require physical characteristics in technological advances would
artificially separate intangible information-processing tools from
earlier physical implements and processes.
304. See, e.g., V. Gordon Childe, Early Forms of Society, in 1 A HISTORY OF
TECHNOLOGY 38 (Charles Singer et al. eds., 1954); Robert E. McGinn, What is
Technology?, in 1 RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY & TECHNOLOGY: AN ANNUAL
COMPILATION OF RESEARCH 179, 179-81 (Paul T. Durbin ed., 1978).
305. McGinn, supra note 304, at 181.
306. Childe, supra note 304, at 38.
307. Thomas, supra note 55, at 53.
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While discoveries involving new or improved physical items and
physical process steps have been and will continue to be important
types of technological innovations, in our present era information-
processing improvements are often the focus of complex, costly
design and popularization efforts that are similar to the comparable
efforts used to develop and distribute physical advances.3" 8 Advances
in information processing can be implemented with as much or more
utility and public advantage as earlier physical advances. Given that
these information-processing advances have the critical features of
earlier physical technology-utility, repeatably delivered to solve
practical problems-intangible information-processing improvements
should be considered to be technological advances on a par with
earlier physical advances.
To ignore this equivalency and exclude intangible advances from
our notions of technology is to tie our definitions of technology to
outdated expectations about the future. Once, most new, practical
tools were physical in nature, involving either physical inner workings
or physical results. It was reasonable in this environment to expect
that future developments would be along the same lines and to define
technological development of artificial, useful tools as a purely
physical domain of discovery and design.
However, the advent of widespread computer usage and the
corresponding proliferation of computer-mediated information
processing has changed the essential nature of innovation in our time.
In many practical engineering contexts, new information is the design
goal, and new intangible processes to produce the new information are
the design result.30 9 Both the means and ends of this type of design
are intangible. If we are to free our notions of technology from the
boundaries of past patterns of technological knowledge and
innovation, we must avoid notions of technology that require physical
contents or transformations. Technology, as an inherently changing,
expanding domain of knowledge and practice, should not be so
historically-and, one is tempted to say, physically-bound.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 41-45.
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3. Limiting technology to physical accommodations
Additional commentators have argued that technological
advances are limited to innovations that have a specific physical
relationship to the surroundings in which the innovations are used.
For example, according to John R. Thomas, "technology may be
characterized as knowledge that is applied towards material enterprise,
guided by an orientation to the external environment and the necessity
of design." 3 0 Technology analyst Paul W. DeVore agrees, noting that
"[t]hinking in technology is problem specific and environmentally
specific, concerned with efficiency and the relationship of elements in
the behavior of a total system."311 To DeVore, acclimation of a
practical activity to a physical environment is a characteristic trait of
technology: "[T]echnological knowledge is knowledge generated
through activities involved in creating adaptive systems as opposed to
knowledge used to create ideological and/or social systems."
312
While recognizing that many technological advances involve
useful physical links between the advances and their surroundings,
these definitions emphasizing the need for a physical "fit" between a
technological advance and an external environment seem to mix and
muddle two thoughts.
First, these definitions may be based on the restrictive view that
technology includes only physically useful structures that interact
favorably with external environments. This is but a narrower version
of the physical transformation based definition of technology
previously addressed in this Article.313 Under the narrower physical
accommodation standard, a technological innovation must not only
involve physical elements or produce physical transformations, but
those elements or transformations must interact with some further
physical features of a surrounding environment to achieve useful
results.314 This sort of additional requirement of a physical interaction
with a surrounding environment takes us further and further away
from recognizing purely intangible advances as technological
310. Id. at 46.
311. PAUL W. DEVORE, TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 226 (1980).
312. Id. at225.
313. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
314. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 55, at 46 (stating that technology is
"knowledge that is applied towards material enterprise, guided by an
orientation to the external environment and the necessity of design").
422
INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
innovations. If an information-processing advance can provide
desirable results to users without manipulating or interacting with a
physical context, there seems little reason to interpret the information-
processing advance as a nontechnological discovery merely because it
lacks external physical impacts. Both intangible and tangible
advances can sometimes provide users with dependable, reusable
utility. If this kind of utility is present, both the intangible and tangible
advances should be considered technological regardless of the
presence of incidental features, such as physical components affecting
external environments.
Demanding physical interactions with external environments as
essential features of technological advances would exclude a broad
range of useful but intangible discoveries from our notions of
technological advances. For example, a variety of seismic data
analysis schemes that use sophisticated mathematical evaluations of
seismic signals to produce valuable insights into the presence and
scope of underground oil deposits would be viewed as
nontechnological under this standard.31 5  No physical steps or
implements are involved in these evaluations, and the analytic
techniques in question do not require any physical interactions with
the geologic conditions they characterize.316 The exclusion of these
techniques from the range of technological advances seems
particularly artificial in that these information-processing advances
substitute for more physical means of oil exploration-such as the
drilling of test wells-which can produce similar information through
physical interactions that would make the physical methods
unquestionably technological.
Definitions of technology focusing on the role of technological
innovations in aiding our interactions with physical environments may
relate to a second, more valuable distinction between technological
innovations and other creative works. As will be discussed at a later
point in this Article, 3 17 technological advances generally operate in
regular, predictable ways to produce predictable results. Innovations
that produce practically significant results by manipulating,
measuring, or interpreting physical surroundings are good examples of
advances with the types of predictable operating outcomes and utility
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
January 2002]
424 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
that are characteristic of technological innovations. Hence, physically
manipulative advances are good examples of technological advances,
but do not exhaust the range of those advances. Innovations for
coping with physical environments are not the only advances with
predictable operating features,318 but they do provide us with means to
study and understand the types of predictable features that are
generally present in technological advances.
In particular, innovations for achieving physical accommodations
or coping with physical environments provide good examples of the
sorts of predictable utility that generally distinguish technological
advances from other, essentially aesthetic creations.
319
Nontechnological expressive advances (e.g., a new CD recording of a
singer's performance) will tend to have subjective, relatively
unpredictable utility, while technological advances (e.g., a new CD
recording of computer software that is capable of regulating a
communications network or measuring physical features of the
network) will have predictable operating features producing
predictable utility. The types of relationships between intangible
information-processing advances and physical surroundings or
environments which produce predictable utility and warrant treatment
of the advances as technological innovations will be examined at a
later point in this Article.320
IV. RECONSTRUCTING PATENTABILITY STANDARDS FOR
AN ERA OF INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
Patentable subject matter standards are difficult to define because
future innovations are hard to predict. Modes of technological
innovation are peculiarly fluid and unpredictable. 321 Patents are
concerned with presently unknown discoveries that are substantially
different than present technology.322 Types of devices and processes
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
321. See id.; see also Thomas, supra note 55, at 10 (stressing the resulting
"constantly shifting contours" of the patent system).
322. In order to be patentable, an advance must be more than just an obvious
extension of current technological knowledge in the field of the advance. This
standard is currently embodied in Section 103 of the Patent Act which provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
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which can be thoroughly described either because they presently exist
or because they involve small, predictably successful variations from
items that presently exist are, by definition, not patentable under our
present standards.323 Only the new and nonobvious discovery-i.e.,
the sort of discovery that is difficult to predict and describe in
advance-will qualify for a patent.
324
Perhaps because of the inherent difficulty of including as yet
unknown technologies in a forward-looking definition of patentable
subject matter, the patentable subject matter standards imposed by
courts and recommended by commentators frequently have been
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966) ("Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against
this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined.").
323. Designs for items or processes that are available to the public through
prior disclosures are unpatentable because the designs are not novel. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). Designs for items or processes that are new but that are
no more than small, obvious variations from the designs of existing items or
processes are not patentable because they do not meet the patent statute's
requirement of nonobviousness. See id. § 103.
324. The scope of differences between a new invention and prior art-and,
hence, the likelihood that the differences will be viewed as nonobvious and the
invention deemed patentable-depends on two types of differences:
The first is the difference between the claims and the prior art purely
in terms of structure or methodology. For product claims, how does
the claimed product differ in physical structure from the products in
the prior art? For process claims, how does the claimed process differ
in terms of operative steps from the processes in the prior art?
'Differences' in this sense are ascertained by interpretation of the
teachings of the prior art and of the claims of the patent or application.
The second is the difference between the claims and the prior art in
terms of functions and advantages (comparative utility). What
functions, advantages and results does the claimed product or process
have that the prior art products or processes do not in fact have?
CHISUM, supra note 1, § 5.03(5)(a) (citation omitted). Where a new invention is
unexpectedly superior in some functional attribute to comparable items or
processes previously known in the prior art, the new invention will typically be
seen as nonobvious and patentable if all other patent law standards are met. See,
e.g., In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646-47 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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overly tied to old technologies. 32 5 These standards have incorporated
patentable subject matter boundaries based on what technology has
been, rather than what it may be. Patents and patentable subject
matter standards should be primarily concerned with the latter-the
development of as yet unknown technological domains and design
approaches. Patentable subject matter standards that describe the
types of innovations to be influenced by patent incentives should
avoid limitations that place useful items or processes based on
fundamentally new types of design or operating principles outside of
the patent system. Definitions of patentable subject matter that are
overly tied to historical modes of innovation may exclude and fail to
encourage new dimensions of advances reflecting the latest design
approaches and technological insights.3 6
Concern over possible legal blindness to evolving types of
innovation in useful devices and practices suggests two desirable
features of patentable subject matter standards. First, these standards
should be broadly inclusive and forward-looking in the types of
innovations that they recognize as patentable subject matter. As
innovation moves into new domains of engineering-such as new
designs for communication technology or bioengineering-notions of
patentable subject matter should be general enough to attach patent
incentives even though the modes and results of the new design
processes are very different than those involved in earlier engineering
of physical implements and physical processes.
Second, while being sufficiently general to include new modes of
technological design, patentable subject matter tests must still be
articulated in terms of objective standards that courts, the PTO, patent
applicants, and potential patent infringers can apply consistently. The
325. See Swanson, supra note 105, at 158-64.
326. A number of courts have recognized the need for broadly inclusive,
technologically diverse standards for identifying patentable subject matter. For
example, in In re Bergy, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed that
"[t]o insist on specific Congressional foresight in construing § 101 would be the
very antithesis of the Constitutional and Congressional purpose of stimulating
the creation of new technologies-by their nature unforeseeable-and their
progressive development." 596 F.2d 952, 973 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In reaching this conclusion, "the
court unanimously agreed that statutory subject matter under § 101 was broadly
drawn to encompass unforeseeable future developments, such as a new field of
technology." Swanson, supra note 105, at 157-58.
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need for forward-looking yet objective standards suggests that
patentable subject matter tests should be framed in terms of objective
descriptions of design discoveries which are capable of furthering the
social utility enhancing goals of the patent system. Patentable subject
matter should include innovations that are capable of being described
to the public and popularized as useful artifacts, regardless of the
technological means used to implement the innovations. This
approach focuses on the knowledge accumulation and communication
circumstances needed for the patent system to operate successfully,
while divorcing patentable subject matter standards from ties to any
particular technology or set of technologies.
The remainder of this section will attempt to develop patentable
subject matter standards that meet these two criteria of forward-
looking generality and objective content. It will begin with an
assessment of the patent system's impact on agency processes in
which innovators serve as problem-solving agents of product and
process users. Based on this agency framework, the analysis proceeds
to specify the circumstances in which patent rights and incentives can
promote the development and dissemination of useful innovations.
Finally, these circumstances are used to define the essential features of
patentable subject matter in standards that can be used as legal tests for
patentable subject matter in both tangible and intangible inventions.
A. An Agency Framework for Patentability Standards
While courts typically analyze patent rights as specialized forms
of property rights that attach to intellectual designs for useful objects
and processes,32 7 the functional impacts of patent rights are perhaps
better understood if those rights are considered as parts of broader
agency processes. In general, an agency process is one in which one
party (the agent) undertakes actions on behalf of, and for the benefit
of, another (the principal). 328 An agency framework is useful in
327. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238-39
(1896) (comparing patents for lands with patents for inventions); CHISUM &
JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[1] (describing judicial views on the scope of
patentable subject matter).
328. An agency process is present whenever one party is called upon to
undertake activities on behalf of another. For a complete treatment of the
features of agency processes, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency,
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
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interpreting inventive processes and related patent incentives because
inventors are, at bottom, agents of invention users. Inventors typically
do not innovate for themselves; rather, they serve as agents of other
product and process users.
329
Agency processes are considered here as a variety of multiparty
social conduct, not just as the focus of a set of substantive legal
standards sometimes referred to as "agency law."330  The agency
processes studied here are varieties of behavior, while agency law is
one of several bodies of law that assist the participants in certain
agency processes in defining associated duties and liabilities.
Typically, agency law applies only where one individual has
consented to serve another through direct agreement with the benefited
party.331 Agency law supplies default terms fleshing out the legal
consequences of this sort of agreement.332 For example, one important
consequence of a party's agreement to serve as the agent of another is
that the agent takes on fiduciary duties with respect to the benefited
party in carrying out agency tasks.: 3
Agency processes in the behavioral sense can be created and
bolstered through a variety of legal measures other than agency laws.
Contract terms are often more important than agency laws in defining
the duties of agents and related rights to compensation upon the
completion of actions by agents.334 Agency laws provide gap fillers
where contractual definitions of agents' and principals' legal
relationships are incomplete. 335 In addition, agency laws also define
the potential liabilities of principals and agents to outsiders injured by
activities conducted through agency processes.336  In this respect,
329. See 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (1962) (describing the role of patents in
encouraging inventors to pursue and deliver innovations desired by the public).
330. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) (discussing
agency law).
331. See id. § I (describing agency law standards that apply to "the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act").
332. See id. § 1 cmt. b.
333. See id.
334. See id. § 1 cmt. c; see also id. §§ 376-77, 432, 441 (distinguishing the
roles of principals and agents).
335. See id. §§ 377-98, 432-62.
336. See id. § 1 cmt. b; see also id. §§ 212-67 (discussing the liability of
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agency laws describe the legal responsibilities of agents and principals
to individuals threatened by agency conduct who are not identifiable at
the time agency contracts are formed or who, although identifiable, are
simply not part of the negotiations leading to those contracts and are
unable to protect their interests through corresponding contract
terms.
337
This Article argues that patent laws should be seen as a further
type of legal standard encouraging and facilitating desirable forms of
agency behavior. The agency conduct promoted by patent standards
involves inventive exploration and development activities undertaken
by innovators on behalf of invention users.338 Patent laws establish
agency relationships between invention users with functional needs
and innovators willing to fill those needs. By properly defining
patentable subject matters and thereby targeting patent incentives, the
formation and completion of innovative agency relationships between
innovators and innovation users can be encouraged. The public will
benefit from these relationships through increased access to the new
and useful inventions the relationships will produce.
This Article aims to evaluate the functional characteristics of
agency relationships used to accomplish technological innovation and
to assess how patent rights can encourage the formation and successful
completion of those agency relationships.
The needs of potential product and process users define the scope
of innovative agency processes. These needs define the functional
parameters that successful innovations must meet. These parameters,
in turn, define the nature of a successful product or process
development effort by an innovative agent.
Innovative processes are agency processes because they generally
involve actions by inventors acting as agents on behalf of potential
product or process users to satisfy these users' needs. By embarking
on their inventive efforts, innovators undertake to act as agents of
product and process users in clarifying the practical needs of those
users and in filling those needs through newly designed inventions.
Innovators successfully carry out their agency roles by developing and
delivering to users products or practices with greater functionality-or
at least different functionality-than previously available substitutes.
principals to third parties).
337. See id.
338. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Patent laws create a framework that enables the formation and
efficient execution of these sorts of innovative agency arrangements.
By doing so, patent laws help potential users of products and
processes to gain the assistance of innovative agents to solve practical
problems that would otherwise stymie the users. At the same time,
patent laws create incentives that encourage innovators to act as
innovative agents for broad classes of potential invention users, and to
apply inventive resources in proportion to the total benefits that
targeted inventions are expected to achieve for broad classes of
persons. Because they are in effect working for broad classes of
parties, inventors can justify expenditures of development resources
that would not be warranted if the inventors were acting only for
themselves. With this multi-user perspective on the proper costs of
research, innovator-agents working for user groups can produce a
wider range of innovations than if the innovators were working for
themselves or a single principal.
Patent laws can encourage the formation of innovative agency
relationships through several means. As will be described in more
detail below, patent rights encourage innovators to assist product and
process users in translating these users' functional desires into more
soluble product and process design problems.339 In this respect, patent
incentives encourage innovators to help define the desired functional
features of successful innovations and, correspondingly, the criteria of
successful design efforts by innovative agents. Second, patent rights
encourage innovators to value various design alternatives in terms of
the utility that those designs achieve for entire classes of users, thereby
establishing an incentive scheme which ties the interests of innovator-
agents to the interests of classes of user-principals. 340 Finally,
minimum content requirements for patent applications encourage
innovators to continue their design and development efforts until their
innovations operate with clear utility and to describe the innovations in
published patents with sufficient completeness and clarity that readers
of the patents can both evaluate and replicate the innovations. 341 This
level of invention description in publicly available patents aids
potential users--or companies serving those users-in monitoring the
utility and merit of inventions.
339. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.a.
340. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.b.
341. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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To secure, these benefits of innovative agency processes, patent
laws should attach to innovative efforts-and patentable subject
matter should be recognized-where the promise of patent rights to
innovators will encourage the formation and completion of innovative
agency relationships. This section describes the patentable subject
matter tests suggested by this approach. The analysis here proceeds in
three steps. First, the essential elements of successful agency
relationships are described. Second, the potential impacts of patent
rights in furthering the creation of innovative agency relationships are
explored in detail. Third, the types of innovations which can be
furthered through patent-influenced agency relationships are
examined. A test for patentable subject matter is then proposed which
recognizes such subject matter in all innovations that are susceptible to
creation and popularization though agency processes.
B. Requirements for Effective Agency Processes
To better understand the role of patent rights in promoting
innovation through agency processes, it is first important to
understand the essential components of agency relationships generally.
Based on an understanding of these components, we can then consider
the impacts that patent rights and incentives may have in creating and
strengthening innovative agency relationships.
An agency relationship typically possesses three essential
features: (1) standards defining the actions which a principal desires
an agent to undertake, (2) means to encourage the agent to undertake
those actions,342 and (3) means to monitor steps undertaken by the
agent to determine if the desired actions have been completed. 43
Typically, these elements are interrelated. For example, statements of
desired actions by agents and criteria for granting rewards to agents
are often linked.344  An agent is often promised rewards that are
contingent upon the completion of the tasks desired by the agent's
principal, thereby giving the agent a personal stake in the completion
of the tasks targeted by the principal.345 Similarly, monitoring of
agent activities and the delivery of agent rewards are often linked.346
342. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 330, § 14.
343. See Arrow, supra note 328, at 37-38.
344. Seeid. at37-38.
345. See id. at 43-44.
346. See id. at 45-46.
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That is, a principal will often monitor an agent's activities to
determine if the tasks desired by the principal have been undertaken
and if the rewards promised for completion of those tasks should be
delivered.347
Agency relationships are present in many day-to-day activities.
For example, a simple agency relationship is formed when a child
agrees to mow a neighbor's lawn. The child might come to the
neighbor's door and offer to mow the lawn in exchange for a payment
of $10, with payment to be made when the task is completed. If the
neighbor agrees, an agency relationship is formed, as well as a related
payment contract. The payment contract-much like the patent rights
of interest here-supports the agency relationship, but is only a part of
a broader picture.
This mowing arrangement has all of the essential features of an
agency relationship just described. The child (the agent) agrees to act
on behalf of the neighbor (the principal) to undertake a task that the
latter wishes to complete. The scope of the desired actions is simple
and well defined-the mowing of the lawn. The means of
encouraging the agent to undertake these actions and to tie his or her
efforts to the interests of the principal are that the promised payment is
held back until the agent's tasks are successfully completed-i.e., until
the child successfully completes the mowing. Finally, the means of
monitoring the completion of the agency tasks is also simple-the
neighbor can simply inspect his or her lawn and withhold payment to
the child until the mowing is complete. This scenario provides a
simple but complete example of how agency processes and supporting
legal arrangements (in this case, a compensation contract) arise
frequently in day-to-day activities.
While principals sometimes provide agents with detailed
specifications of desired actions, this is not always the case. In
settings where agents have greater expertise than the principals they
serve, the principals may only have broad, ill-defined goals which the
agents must interpret and flesh out.348 In these settings, agents must
use their expertise to both define and satisfy the goals of their
principals.
349
347. See id. at 45.
348. See LEONARD LAKN & MARTiN SCmIFF, THE LAW OF AGENCY 103-10
(1984).
349. See id.; RESTATEMENT, supra note 330, §§ 33-35, 379, 383.
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For example, in a doctor-patient relationship, a doctor is the agent
of his or her patient for purposes of improving or maintaining the
health of the patient. This general goal defines the scope of the agency
relationship between a doctor and patient. However, in acting as the
agent of a patient, a doctor must often clarify further detailed goals of
the doctor-patient relationship. A doctor does this by determining
what sorts of treatment a patient needs. Once these needs are
determined, steps carrying out the indicated treatment become detailed
goals of the doctor-patient relationship. In assisting with a patient's
treatment, a doctor shifts from goal defining to goal satisfying. In both
activities the doctor is an agent of the patient-principal.
Similarly, the agency relationships between product and process
user-principals and innovator-agents may involve substantial
discretion on the part of the innovators in defining the design goals of
the agency relationship and the means of achieving them. Businesses
or individuals reveal broadly defined functional needs-perhaps by
buying products that presently fill those needs or by undertaking
activities that imply the needs in a publicly disclosed way. However,
these parties may not specify or care how those functional needs are
filled. These partially defined, but publicly revealed needs define the
goals of innovative agency relationships. Innovators, acting as agents
of the parties with the needs, seek to clarify the detailed characteristics
of those needs and to create new means to fill the needs. In these
settings, the needs of innovation-users define the broad contours of
successful innovations and successful invention development efforts
by innovator-agents. However, in specifying the details of design
problems as well as in producing solutions, innovator-agents have
substantial control over the end products of innovation and the means
for producing those products through innovative agency relationships.
C. Features of Patent Law Furthering Innovative Agency Processes
1. Defining agency goals
Potential invention users and inventors each define portions of the
goals of innovative agency relationships. Patent rights can play an
important role in aligning the perspective of users and inventors in the
goal-setting process. In their efforts to clarify user needs and to
identify available technologies for filling those needs, innovators can
be strongly motivated by potential patent rights to keep in mind the
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needs and desires of potential invention users. By defining contingent
property interests with values that vary in accordance with the values
of the new functionality provided to invention users, patent rights
encourage inventors to evaluate the functional needs of invention users
and to translate these needs into invention design projects. 350 The
promise of patent rewards that are scaled in value to user benefits
achieved through new innovations cause innovators to keep the
interests of invention users in mind in defining both the procedures
and ends of innovation projects.
Potential invention users define the essential functional
characteristics, of new inventions.351 They do so through ongoing
behaviors or activities which describe or imply functional tasks that
the users wish to accomplish and deem valuable.352 Existing business
or individual activities that indicate the need to complete some
functional task may serve as direct evidence of desired functionality.
Desired functionality can also be determined indirectly from the
features of existing devices or processes that can be improved or
replaced by other devices or processes based on different
technologies.353 For example, a procedure for assembling a particular
device by hand may reflect certain essential assembly steps. These
essential steps will define the functional characteristics which any
machine assembling the same item must also possess. In essence, the
prior hand-assembly version of this process-coupled with the
economic value of the assembly process and the implied willingness
of companies using the process to pay for a better way of
accomplishing the same item assembly at a lower cost-implicitly
signals to innovators the scope and potential value of a process
improvement task that may warrant inventive efforts.354
An innovator may become aware of a desire for innovation in this
type of device assembly through several means. First, an innovator
may be a company or industry insider and be aware of some
frequently repeated task that is susceptible to machine automation if a
350. See DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK: TACTICS AND
PRACTICE 31-33 (3d ed. 1999).
351. See WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 1-5 (1943).
352. See id.
353. See BURGE, supra note 350, at 32-33.
354. See id. at 27-46.
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suitable device can be developed.355 Second, an innovator or her
company may have been involved in the design of similar devices and
maintain ongoing contacts with the industry where these earlier
devices are used.356 These ongoing contacts may indicate the need for
improvements or additional devices to serve the same customer base.
Third, the innovator may be an expert concerning a particular
technology and seek to identify new uses for the technology.357 A
systematic search for user needs that the technology might satisfy may
identify potential applications for the technology if the innovator has
sufficient insight to see relationships between the functional
characteristics of the technology and the functional needs of
individuals or businesses.
Through whatever means the needs of potential invention users
are communicated, an innovator who is aware of needs for a new type
of invention may still have to define the key features that are desired
in the invention before any meaningful inventive work can be done.
For example, in the device assembly context previously described, an
inventor might need to study the process used for hand assembly of
the device to identify the essential subassembly steps as well as the
key characteristics of the component parts and assembled products.
These characteristics of the component parts and assembled products
define the outside parameters within which the innovator's invention
must work. That is, a successful invention in this context must take
the same input components and produce the same results.
The innovator may also gain additional insights by evaluating the
practices of the persons currently undertaking the hand assembly
process. These practices constitute one set of complete and successful
assembly steps that might be replicated in machine-operating steps.
358
Furthermore, past hand assembly practices may reveal stages in the
assembly process involving fragile component features or critical
alignment situations. The same features and situations may need to be
taken into account in designing a machine that will complete the same
assembly task.359 Overall, these sorts of factual assessments of past
versions of the assembly process help to define the desirable
355. See generally id. at 32-33 (discussing sources of inventions).
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
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characteristics of a machine that will perform the needed assembly
task.360 From the better understanding of the desired machine she
gains, the innovator can go on to define the specific invention design
goals that the innovator-agent will need to meet to produce a
successful invention.
The invention design criteria produced in this way are developed
by the innovator with the benefit of his or her particular technological
expertise and perspective. Indeed, innovators with different technical
backgrounds may approach the same user need differently, focusing
on different subcomponents of the functionality needed or on different
means of providing that functionality. Based on these different
perspectives, multiple innovators may work in a single application
area yet produce very different inventions. These different inventions
may fill a particular type of user need through different technologies
or different operating methods.
2. Aligning interests
a. alignment concerning design functionality
Patent laws help to ensure that innovators are attentive to the
functional needs of invention users and that the innovators invest the
analytic effort necessary to translate these user needs into
technological design goals within the particular technological
specialties of the innovators. 361 Patent laws achieve this by promising
rewards to innovators that are approximately equal in value to the
value of the increased functionality that the innovators' discoveries
provide to users.
362
360. See id.
361. See GUIDE TO INVENTION AND INNOVATION EVALUATION 73-74
(Gerald G. Udell et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter INVENTION AND INNOVATION
EVALUATION]. See generally Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protectioh for
Software-Related Inventions in the Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CoRNELL L. REV., 1118, 1163-64 (2000)
(observing that "[flunctionality is the domain of patent law; unless Congress
legislates a sui generis protection scheme, patent law provides the only
comprehensive protection for the functional aspects of [various technology
specialties]").
362. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (1994); Seth A. Cohen, To Innovate or Not to
Innovate, That Is the Question: The Functions, Failures, and Foibles of the
Reward Function Theory of Patent Law in Relation to Computer Software
Plaforms, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998), available at
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The opportunity to gain rewards scaled in this way to the value of
an invention to users derives directly from a patent holder's ability to
control the making, use, and sale of a patented invention.363 Using the
example described above, if a new machine design is able to cut
assembly costs from $1.00 per unit to $.20 per unit, a rational business
person would pay a royalty of up to $.80 per unit (assuming no other
costs were involved) to use the new machine. So long as the user's
cost in adopting the machine is less than $.80 per unit, the
manufacturer is better off with the machine than without it. Hence,
the patent holder will be able to charge a royalty and gain a reward for
the invention that is approximately equal to the user's gains from the
invention. Of course, actual royalties will probably be somewhat less
than the full value gained by invention users due to transaction costs
and the need to give users an incentive, in the form of some retained
portion of the gain, to shift from using previous alternatives to using
the new invention. However, even taking these additional factors into
account, available patent royalties and rewards should closely track the
user value realized through a new invention, thereby giving inventors
substantial reasons to pursue this type of value in shaping innovative
efforts.
Under this method of valuing inventions, the more incremental
value over past practices that an invention provides, the more a patent
holder can expect to charge for use of the invention. This link
between the value provided to users and patent value effectively aligns
the economic interests of innovators to those of invention users. Since
innovators will understand from the outset of their inventive efforts
that users of their inventions will pay royalties 364 which depend on the
http://www.mttlr.org/volfive/cohen-art.html (stating that "the reward function
utilizes legal devices to create incentives for technological innovation and
disclosure by means of granting rewards which are otherwise unrecognizable
by the innovator").
363. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
364. The analysis in this section assumes that an innovator realizes gains from
a patent by charging a royalty for use of the patented invention. Equivalent gains
may be realized by charging elevated prices for sales of a patented invention.
The analysis of how much the sales price of a patented invention can be elevated
over the price of nonpatented substitutes is equivalent to the patent royalty
analysis presented in the main text. Sales prices for a patented item can be
elevated by an amount less than or equal to the value of the increased utility
achieved by the patented version of the item, above and beyond the utility
achieved by nonpatented alternatives to the patented product. Since the
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incremental value users receive from those inventions, inventors'
notions about the desirable features of new designs-including both
performance characteristics and operating costs-will conform to the
perspectives and economic interests of potential invention users.
365
b. alignment concerning design approaches
The alignment of the interests of invention creators and users
through the promise of patent rights influences not only the invention
designs that innovators produce, but also the design approaches that
are given serious attention by innovators.366 Few innovators will
waste time on design approaches that either achieve less desirable
results than preexisting substitutes or that achieve better results than
those substitutes but at a significantly greater cost. Rather, the
emphasis in defining invention design goals and related interim design
steps and problems to be solved is on minimizing the costs of
implementing and operating inventions and maximizing the value of
invention functionality.367 Innovators often contribute substantially to
the diagnosis of the key features of a successful product or process
design and in doing so play key roles in defining the remaining design
tasks desired of them as innovative agents.36" However, in identifying
considerations governing sales price increases for patented products are directly
parallel to those governing royalties for use of the same products, additional
discussion of patent-influenced sales prices is not presented in the main text.
365. See 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 18.06 (2001); see
also Joby A. Hughes & Kate L. Birenbaum, Insuring Intellectual Property
Risks: Creative Solutions on the Cuffing Edge, in PROTECTING YOUR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS 1999, at 203 (1999) (stating that "patent
value can be established quantitatively based on the incremental value
associated with higher sales and increased price as compared to other models
that do not have the [patented] feature"); Lauren Johnston Stiroh & Richard T.
Rapp, Modern Methods for the Valuation of Intellectual Property, in PLI'S
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 821 (4th ed.
1998) (stating that "[o]nly inventions that fulfill a need that producers or
consumers are willing to pay to fulfill can be valuable").
366. See Stiroh & Rapp, supra note 365, at 8-9. See generally Roger L.
Beck, Patents and Over-Investment in Process Inventions: Reply, 45 S. ECON.
J. 289 (1978) (discussing the appropriate reward for partially and completely
redundant inventions).
367. See NUALA SWORDS-ISHERWOOD, THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION: A
STUDY OF COMPANIES IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM 9-15 (1984).
368. See id.
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design targets within the context of promised patent rights, the
innovators assume the perspective and interests of their user-
principals. Hence, the design criteria that emerge are the same sorts
that the user-principals would articulate if they had the technological
expertise of the innovators involved.
c. alignment concerning design procedures
In addition to influencing the substance of innovative designs,
patent rights also affect the nature of the innovative procedures
undertaken to realize those designs. The direction and scope of
invention design efforts are beneficially tied to the interests of
invention users through the contingent promise of patent rights.369
Because the interests of innovators and invention users are aligned, an
innovator will tend to seek an optimal balance of inventive effort costs
and related improvements in invention functionality.370 In this regard,
the incentives to innovators afforded by patent rights avoid wasteful
innovation efforts and produce innovations with greater net gains to
society after innovation costs are taken into account.
371
Patent rights give innovators a stake in producing useful
innovations at the lowest possible cost.3 72 The innovator's potential
gain from a patented invention does not equal the full amount of
patent royalties the innovator charges for access to the new invention,
or the full amount of profits from sales of the patented item or service,
but rather equals the net gain after innovation costs are subtracted
from these royalties or profits.373 Because their opportunities to gain
369. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1992) (stating that the decision to invent "can be
thought of as an investment decision like any other. The inventor faces the
choice of attempting to invent, or of investing her money elsewhere. In this
conception, patents are held out as a potential reward to induce the inventor to
decide to proceed with research.").
370. See INVENTION AND INNOVATION EVALUATION, supra note 361, at 73-
74.
371. See id. at 29.
372. See KERRY SCHOTT, INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 46-52 (1981).
373. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting
Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 710 (1997) (stating that "[ain
innovation is good for society whenever its societal value (the sum of
consumer and producer surplus) exceeds its development costs .... Goods that
satisfy this criterion will be produced whenever an original innovator believes
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decrease as innovation costs increase, innovators are encouraged to
avoid unnecessary innovation costs.374  In addition, as their work
progresses, innovators have a personal financial stake in maintaining a
reasonable balance between the resources allocated to additional
innovative efforts and the increased invention functionality and value
that are likely to result from the further efforts.
375
In maintaining this balance between resource allocation and likely
results, an innovator typically will not consider just the value that an
invention under development will achieve for a particular user, but
rather will tend to take into account the full extent of increased value
the invention will realize for all users of the invention.376 This means
that an innovator will be able to justify and complete innovation
efforts that are of benefit to a group of users, but that would not be
worthwhile for the innovator, or any single user, to undertake based on
the increased functional value the targeted innovation is expected to
achieve for any particular user. In this respect, innovators are not only
effective agents of invention users, but they are also efficient cost
spreaders, allocating the cost of innovation efforts across multiple
invention users and royalty-charging opportunities.
By causing innovators to adopt the perspective of an entire group
of invention users, patent incentives achieve two important benefits at
the group level. First, these incentives ensure that inventive resources
are applied at efficient levels by measuring the cost-effectiveness of
using additional resources to develop each aspect of the innovation in
light of its functional gains to the entire group of invention users. If an
additional inventive effort would be likely to produce net benefits to
the overall set of users of a patentable invention, that effort will be
that his own personal reward (producer surplus) will exceed those same
development costs.").
374. See id.; INVENTION AND INNOVATION EVALUATION, supra note 361, at
35-36.
375. See Lichtman, supra note 373, at 710; INVENTION AND INNOVATION
EVALUATION, supra note 361, at 31-44.
376. See SWORDS-ISHERWOOD, supra note 367, at 12-13; Lichtman, supra
note 373, at 702 n.32 (stating that an innovator working on only one invention,
who is unsure of success or failure:
will invest in a new idea only if the rewards from success sufficiently
outweigh both the costs of success and the risks (and accompanying
costs) of failure. A system that paid only development costs (the costs
of success) would pay nothing toward this risk premium and therefore
would not sufficiently reward the innovator.).
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encouraged by patent rights. However, inventive efforts that seem
unlikely to produce a net gain for users, even taking into account the
interests of the full user group, will not be encouraged. Even with the
payment opportunities implied by patent rights, an innovator will not
realize any profit from these excessive and inefficient development
efforts.
In addition, giving innovators (and their financial backers)
incentives to invest in inventive efforts at the resource levels justified
by benefits to the full set of users of the inventions will lead to
substantially funded and quickly conducted development efforts to
produce new products and services as new technical advances imply
the potential success of these development efforts. Because inventive
programs are conducted at levels justified by the potential benefits to
all users of the resulting products rather than at the lesser resource
levels justified by the possible benefits to a few users, successful
inventive programs tend to be pursued more aggressively and quickly
than if only the needs of a few users were driving these programs. The
increased pace of innovation in these programs opens up new design
methods and reveals new technological information more rapidly than
if patents were absent. In addition, the quick pursuit and disclosure of
innovations that are developed to gain patent rewards may cut off
some duplicative efforts that would otherwise have been undertaken
by multiple innovators working for multiple users. Avoiding this
wasteful duplication of effort can produce significant societal benefits
by leaving the resources not spent on these duplicative efforts to be
applied to more productive activities.
3. Enhancing agent monitoring
In order to monitor the progress of innovative agents, potential
users of innovations need information about the innovations produced
by the agents. With this information, potential users can determine if
the innovators have produced successful advances and can decide
when innovators should be compensated for their successful design
efforts. For innovative agency processes leading to patentable
inventions, this type of monitoring of agent progress occurs at the
stage when inventions are disclosed to the public through the issuance
of a patent. By using invention descriptions in issued patents or
further accounts of patented inventions in journal or newsletter articles
derived from patent disclosures, potential users can monitor the
January 2002]
442 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
inventions involved and determine which, if any, of the patented
inventions the users would like to acquire or use.
The willingness of potential users to pay for access to new
products or processes depends on the demonstrated and communicated
utility of the new products or processes.377 Put simply, potential users
will pay for access to innovative new products and processes if and
only if those products and processes possess substantial utility and that
utility is communicated to the users in a way that they can understand
and evaluate in relation to the users' practical problems.
The invention disclosures that inventors must make to gain patent
rights aid in the completion of innovative agency relationships by
ensuring that invention users have the types of information needed to
monitor patented advances. To gain a patent, an inventor must
discover, describe, and disclose a working design for an invention
with identifiable utility.3 78 The disclosure of an invention in an issued
patent ensures that the invention is brought to public attention at a
stage of complete development in an operative state, and through a
thorough description which will aid potential users of the invention in
evaluating it. Once inventions reach this stage of completion and
description, potential users can at least make a preliminary
determination of whether the inventions will be useful to them and
how much they are willing to pay in royalties or purchase prices to
adopt the inventions. Where an acquisition of a patented invention is
felt to be desirable based on this preliminary assessment, more
detailed information about the invention and how to acquire the right
to use it will be available from the patent holder.
By aiding invention monitoring, patents help to ensure that
successful inventions of innovator-agents are actually transferred to
user-principals. Enhanced monitoring of new inventions through
issued patents and other distributed information derived from those
patents also expands the number of users of inventions, thereby
increasing the likelihood that innovator-agents will be compensated in
close relation to the full scope of enhanced utility achieved by the
innovators' efforts.
377. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966) (holding that
"practical utility... is an essential element in establishing a prima facie case
for the patentability of [a] process"). Id. at 520.
378. See id. at 528-36.
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D. Advances Susceptible to Innovation by Agents
Because agency processes are only effective where (1) principals'
needs are communicated to agents, (2) agents are given incentives to
meet those needs, and (3) principals can monitor agents' actions to
determine if desired performance is rendered by the agents, 379 agency
processes are likely to further innovations in useful items and
processes only where all of these features of agency relationships can
be implemented. Hence, the furtherance of innovation through agency
processes turns on the presence of circumstances where these critical
features of agency processes can operate.
Once the circumstances in which innovative agency processes can
operate are present, a second concern needs to be addressed. When,
within these circumstances, will patent rights be helpful influences on
innovative agency processes? Ideally, patent rights should be adjusted
to assist in the formulation and carrying out of innovative agency
processes in the broadest range of settings where those processes can
produce valuable innovations.
In general, innovative agents will be effective in filling the
functional needs of innovation users where (1) the needs of users are
stable and at least partially defined at the beginning of an innovative
agency relationship, (2) innovators develop new products or
procedures with functional features and useful results that can be
evaluated by user-principals, and (3) the features and utility of those
inventions are fully described so that the descriptions can be
communicated to potential users for evaluation. The remainder of this
section describes why these circumstances are needed to support
innovative agency relationships. The next section of this Article
considers how patent rights may operate in these circumstances to aid
in the formation and completion of agency relationships promoting
innovation.
1. Defined and stable user needs
In order for the needs of user-principals to signal an innovation
opportunity and to foster corresponding innovative agency
relationships, those needs must be at least partially described by users
or be discernable from user practices and stable enough to be
communicated to potential innovators. In an innovative agency
379. See Arrow, supra note328, at 37.
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relationship, the agent involved will expect a reward if he or she
provides a desired functionality to innovation users by developing and
disclosing a useful invention.380 If the needs of innovation users at the
future point when innovative efforts are projected to be completed
cannot be predicted with some reasonable certainty, innovators will
have few hopes for invention-related rewards and, hence, few
incentives to begin invention efforts. The unpredictability of future
user needs will create an uninviting moving target for potential
innovations. At some point of uncertainty about the future needs of
users, innovators will simply not begin innovative projects for fear that
the end results will not match the needs of potential users when the
projects are completed. In these circumstances, innovation by agents
will be stymied because of agents' fears that their innovative efforts
will be wasted.38'
The need for stability in manifest user needs suggests two other
features of innovative agency relationships. First, these relationships
may be of little advantage in settings where items valued by users turn
on highly personal tastes that are subject to substantial variations from
person to person and time to time. In such settings, the features of a
successful innovation-that is, a creation which meets the personal
criteria of users for a pleasing product or work-will be so obscure or
so fluid that innovators will be unlikely to foresee any predictable
reward for embarking on efforts to satisfy the aesthetic desires of
potential principals.
382
Second, innovative agency relationships will tend to vary in
number and scope with the future viability of potential invention users.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. This may not be universally true. There may be, for example, detailed
combinations of aesthetic elements-such as those combined in a written work
or a graphic image-that are predictably pleasing, perhaps because they match or
closely mimic previously pleasing patterns. The creation of these detailed
patterns of aesthetic elements for the benefit of persons other than their
originators may be encouraged by intellectual property laws providing
protections and rewards for the resulting creative works. For example, this type
of encouragement for new expressive works aimed at satisfying aesthetic tastes
is provided under copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332; CHISUM &
JACOBS, supra note 21, § 4A. The protections and incentives that copyright laws
create generally reward persons who correctly predict the aesthetic interests of
readers, viewers, or listeners and who create expressive works that match those
interests.
444
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Even where the present needs of a group of users are well defined, if
there are reasons to question the future viability of the users, there will
be little incentive for innovative agents to pursue solutions to the
problems of these users. Here, the source of uncertainty lies not in the
initial definition of the users' needs, but rather in the potential inability
of the users to compensate a successful innovator in the future.
Absent a substantial likelihood of such compensation upon successful
completion of an innovative agency relationship through the
production and disclosure of a useful invention, agency relationships
for the pursuit of innovation simply will not be formed.
2. Useful, repeatable results
Successful innovative agency relationships generally will be
aimed at producing new products or procedures that have useful,
repeatable applications. This is the case because the functional
benefits of the products of an innovative agency relationship must be
transferable to user-principals at the conclusion of the relationship.383
Without this transferability, there will be no reason for users to pay for
access to the products of the agency relationship and, consequently, no
reward or payment to the agent for his or her work.
Innovations will need to have several characteristics to be
transferable in this way. First, transferable innovations will generally
not involve discretionary steps or practices which require the
application of rarely held expert judgment or skill.384 If such judgment
or skill were required, a new product or procedure would be valuable
only where that judgment or skill could also be obtained. The advance
itself might be seen as having little or no independent value.
385
383. See generally Arrow, supra note 328, at 37 (discussing the role each
party plays in an agency relationship).
384. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 1.03 (noting that innovations that depend
on the aesthetic, emotional, or normative reactions of a human actor should not
be considered to be useful inventions for purposes of patent law).
385. Even if it were used in conjunction with the requisite judgment or skill,
the advance would have a degree of value that is difficult to measure separately
and that would vary in accordance with the care and effectiveness of the person
exercising the judgment or skill. This would significantly impair the ability of
potential users to monitor and evaluate the projected value of a new innovation
and to provide corresponding payments to innovators for developing such an
innovation. The degree of value attributable to a new innovation-as opposed to
that attributable to the judgment or skill of a given user-would always be in
doubt.
January 2002] 445
446 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:355
Second, innovations that are the products of innovative agency
relationships must be developed to the point that they operate in a
regular fashion to perform particular functions time and again.386 This
sort of regular performance is needed in order for useful and reliable
functionality to be transferred to users of the innovation. Absent
regular operations and results, a purported innovation may be under-
or over-valued by potential users and under- or over-utilized in the
activities of those users. Regularity of operation of a new innovation
not only promotes accurate assessments of its desirability by various
potential users, but also helps to ensure that users who adopt the
innovation are not forced to waste resources in accommodating the
unpredictable failures of the innovation.
387
3. Specifically and completely described innovations
Since the ultimate goal of an innovative agency relationship is the
transfer of a new, useful product or practice from an innovative-agent
to one or more user-principals, the successful completion of such a
relationship depends in part on the acquisition and transfer to users of
certain information about a new invention. In particular, the key
operative features of an invention and the results achieved by the
innovation must be understood and described to potential users with
sufficient particularity and detail to permit the effective evaluation and
use of the innovation. This descriptive requirement implies several
further features that innovations must have to be produced effectively
through agency relationships.
First, the innovations must be capable of specific description.
388
This implies that devices and procedures that require substantial
discretionary choices for successful operation may not be sufficient.
Such devices and procedures cannot be completely described because
the exercise of expert judgment required to operate them cannot be
broken down into fully described components.389 Absent a description
of the basis for the exercise of discretion in connection with the device
386. See WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, PATENT LAw 389
(4th ed. 1995) (discussing utility as a necessary feature of a patentable
invention).
387. See id.
388. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
389. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996); FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 408-
12.
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or procedure, a potential user will be unable to predict the means and
success of operating a new device or practice and correspondingly will
be unable to assess the cost-effectiveness of this new invention relative
to preexisting substitutes.
Second, where an invention is capable of being described
completely-that is, where the invention is comprised of specific,
well-understood components or steps-the eventual transfer of this
invention to users will be furthered by the inventor's prompt
completion of a full description coupled with the public disclosure of
that description.390 The disclosure of a full invention description is a
means to promote the efficient and complete evaluation of the
invention by potential users.39 1 Patent law requirements that compel
patent applicants to make these types of disclosures promote invention
evaluations in several ways. Potential users seeking to evaluate a new
advance can begin their evaluations by reviewing the innovator's
complete description of the invention.392  This ensures the
consideration and reuse of the innovator's analyses by multiple parties
rather than requiring each potential invention user to engage in
wasteful reevaluations of the same invention features already
addressed by the innovator. Moreover, this ensures that potential
invention users gain the full insights provided by an innovator's
expertise concerning the means of constructing and operating an
innovation. Often, the result will be better informed assessments of
new inventions than would occur if the users (or someone acting on
their behalf) started their assessments of the inventions from scratch.
The requirement of a reasonably complete description of a new
invention as a basis for granting a patent does not imply that an
inventor must describe all of the scientific principles or internal
operating features involved in that invention.393 Indeed, many useful
inventions are marketed to consumers before the internal operations of
the inventions are fully understood.394 What is necessary is that the
390. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at
410-11 (discussing invention description requirements for a valid patent).
391. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7479; FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 408.
392. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7487; FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 408.
393. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7486; FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 409.
394. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
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critical input, output, and operational requirements associated with a
new invention be described with reasonable completeness and
certainty.395 A potential user needs to evaluate these features of a new
invention to assess whether adoption of the new invention is likely to
advance the user's activities. Thus, the notion of a complete
description must be assessed from the standpoint of the types of
information that a potential user of the invention would need in order
to assess the functional advantages of an invention. This includes the
characteristics of inputs and outputs of the invention and further
details (such as implementation steps) which will bear on the costs and
other operational impacts of using the invention.
396
V. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER TESTS PROMOTING INNOVATION
THROUGH AGENCY PROCESSES
A. Where Contracts Are Enough: Agency Innovation
in One-to-One Relationships
The types of innovative agency process which have been
described in this Article can be encouraged and rewarded on a small
scale without patent rights or incentives. The innovation targets,
incentives, monitoring arrangements, and rewards that are needed to
form innovative agency relationships on a small scale can be
established through contractual arrangements.397
To take a simple example, consider a small shoe-making business
that wishes to improve its machines for attaching soles to shoes. The
business can hire an engineer and establish an agency agreement that
covers this design process. To provide a framework for an innovative
agency relationship, the contract with the engineer would need to: (1)
specify the type of design desired, (2) establish a compensation
scheme under which at least some of the engineer's compensation is
contingent on producing a successful design, and (3) define a means
Reg. at 7486.
395. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7486; FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 408-13.
396. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 7487.
397. See generally Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubrication Tech., Inc., 148 F.3d 742,
745 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the necessary features of an agency
relationship created by conduct or contract); RESTATEMENT, supra note 330,
§ 1 (describing agency relationships created through contracts).
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for assessing whether the engineer has produced a successful design
such that the contingent compensation should be paid to the agent.
This sort of one-to-one innovative agency relationship is present
in a variety of settings. For example, a company that encourages its
employees to provide the company with innovative ideas through an
employee suggestion program and rewards the employees who submit
valuable ideas establishes innovative agency relationships through
employment contract terms. Similarly, a company that engages a
consultant or employee to produce a new or improved design for a
product or practice uses the consulting or employment contract
involved to establish an innovative agency relationship.
In such contract-based agency settings, the rewards and
restrictions of patent law are not necessary to encourage the types of
agent behavior that will produce successful innovations. The terms of
the contracts involved in these settings can define the essential agency
features, including: (1) the desired work products of the innovator-
agent, (2) the contingent compensation which will align the interests
of the agent with his or her principal, and (3) the mechanisms for
evaluating the results of the agency process and for providing
compensation upon the delivery of successful results.398
B. Beyond Contracts: The Need for Patent Incentives to Overcome
Contractual Breakdowns in Large User Groups
Many innovative efforts involve situations where mechanisms for
the formation of agency relationships through contractual processes
will not be adequate to produce the full range of potentially desirable
agency relationships. These situations are present where numerous
users share a particular need, yet lack effective means to contract for
the assistance of innovator-agents to meet that need.3 99 Sufficient
contracting mechanisms may be lacking in these circumstances for
several reasons.
398. See generally Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bradley Real Estate Trust, 909 F.2d
1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing an agent's role as governed by contract
terms); RESTATEMENT, supra note 330, § 1 (discussing the agent's role in an
agency relationship).
399. These conditions will be present where parties share common activities
and corresponding needs for supplies and tools to support those activities, but
do not have cost-effective methods for contracting (either separately or as a
group) with innovators who might fill the needs.
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First, the transaction costs of joint contracting may preclude
multiple innovation users from successfully identifying each other and
banding together to negotiate and administer the necessary contracts.
Second, even if these parties could join together, they might be unable
to agree on a means to share the associated development costs in light
of their differences in planned use and perceived value of the jointly
sought innovation. Third, efforts among competitors to band together
and contract jointly for innovation services might raise antitrust
concerns and associated deterrents to effective action.
Finally, and most significantly, even if multiple innovation users
appreciate their joint interests in particular innovations, each of them
might hold back from participation in the joint funding of
development efforts in the hope that other members of the user group
would support the full costs of the development efforts. 40 0 Were this
to occur in the absence of patent limitations, the nonpaying users
could adopt advances at no development cost and achieve a
corresponding competitive advantage. In short, hopes of being a
"freerider" concerning the development of a new innovation would
cause each of the potentially interested parties to resist contributing
resources to the development efforts, with the result that the formation
of innovation development contracts involving multiple innovation
users would be impaired or stopped entirely.
401
For these reasons, contractual formation of innovative agency
relationships may be particularly ineffective where needs and
opportunities for applying a particular innovation are widely shared.
To generate desirable innovation agency arrangements in these
circumstances, alternative legal standards constituting "default rules"
or contractual substitutes should be recognized to create the agency
incentives which contractual processes are unlikely to produce. Patent
rights can serve as contract substitutes to encourage innovation by
agents on behalf of large, uncoordinated groups of innovation users.
C. Patentable Subject Matter Tests Promoting
Innovative Agency Relationships
Patent rights can encourage innovators to act as if they are
contractually engaged agents of innovation users despite the absence
400. See Lichtman, supra note 373, at 710.
401. See id.
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of an effective means to form contracts between the innovators and
users. To ensure that the broadest possible range of innovative agency
relationships is furthered, patent rights should be recognized in all
settings where innovative agency arrangements can be useful, but are
unlikely to be formed through contractual processes.
Patentable subject matter tests can be thought of as descriptions of
the range of subject matters towards which patents will serve as
substitutes for contracts in encouraging the formation of innovative
agency relationships. 40 2 Hence, a given type of innovation should be
deemed patentable subject matter where there is a clear opportunity
for developing that innovation through agency processes and a lack of
effective means for contracting to create the agency processes.
Noncontractual, patent-based incentives will be likely to
encourage the formation of desirable agency relationships for
innovation where two conditions are present. First, these incentives
will be valuable where a particular innovation has features that make
the innovation susceptible to development and implementation
within an agency process. This will be the case where an advance
has the features already identified in this Article as making an
innovation a good candidate for development by agents-namely, an
ability of the innovation to meet a predefined user need through
repeatable operations delivering predictable utility. Second, due to
the potential costs of applying the patent system, patent incentives
should be reserved for those circumstances where private contracting
is unlikely to be effective in forming desirable agency arrangements.
This suggests that patent rights should generally be reserved for
innovations that address widely shared user needs in settings where
group contracting to secure innovative efforts is likely to be
ineffective.
Taken together, these criteria suggest that patentable subject
matter should have the following features:
1) An innovation filling a user need with identifiable value;
2) The innovation fills a need that is shared by more than a few
potential users;
3) The innovation meets the need though regular operations that
produce consistent results; and
4) The innovation and the results it achieves can be described
402. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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clearly and distinctly, permitting effective evaluation of the
innovation.4 °3
This proposed standard for patentable subject matter is not tied to
particular physical features or technological domains. Rather, it
extends the patent system to all types of innovations-tangible and
intangible-that are likely to be furthered through innovative agency
processes.
Each of the four components of the proposed standard serves a
different purpose in limiting the scope of the patent system. The first
component ensures that patent incentives and restrictions are only
created where innovative agents have clear targets for innovative
efforts and have related means for measuring the scope of reasonable
innovative efforts in light of the aggregate benefits an innovation will
be likely to achieve. The second component of the proposed standard
ensures that the conduct restrictions and administrative costs imposed
by the patent system are only invoked where contractual processes for
engaging agency innovation are unlikely to be successful. The third
component of the proposed standard limits patent rights to situations
where innovators have produced innovations that have consistent
results providing repeatable value to users such that potential users can
evaluate the innovations in terms of that value. Finally, the last
component of the proposed standard adds a descriptive requirement to
the third component, restricting patent rights to situations where
403. Portions of these tests for patentable subject matter admittedly overlap
with other minimum standards that must be met by a patentable invention. In
particular, the first criterion focusing on the need for an innovation to fill a user
need with identifiable value imposes a test that is probably coextensive with the
traditional requirement that patents should only attach to inventions with
identifiable utility. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; FRANCIs & COLLINS, supra note 386, at
170-73. Similarly, the requirement that patentable subject matter be capable of
being described completely states a test that is related to the requirement that a
complete patent application must include an enabling disclosure from which a
specialist in the field of the invention can understand and recreate the invention.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101; FRANCIS & COLLINS, supra note 386, at 408-13. The
appearance of these similar standards in patentable subject matter tests and other
patent law tests should create no problems, so long as they are interpreted
consistently. In any case, these standards are included here as part of patentable
subject matter tests because satisfaction of these standards is a critical step
towards the effective formation of innovative agency relationships. So long as
tests are applied which limit patent rights and incentives to circumstances where
innovative agency relationships can operate effectively, it matters little where in
patent law doctrine these tests reside.
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innovators can translate their development and understanding of useful
advances into clear descriptions of those advances that facilitate the
evaluation and use of the advances by parties other than the inventors.
VI. APPLYING PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
TESTS TO INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS
Under the proposed standard, patentable subject matter is freed
from the bounds of physical designs to encompass a broader range of
regularly operative, demonstrably valuable innovations regardless of
their lack of physical details. The key feature of patentable subject
matter under the approach advocated here is transferable utility from
an artificial (i.e., nonnatural) device, composition, or practice. The
necessary utility may derive from a physical transformation of
something to achieve a useful result, but need not involve such a
physical transformation. Rather, in our information-based age,
artificially constructed, useful tools comprising patentable subject
matter will increasingly involve intangible, but regularly operative and
useful information-processing techniques.4 °4
At least three questions deserve further attention before physical
content limits on patentable subject matter are abandoned completely.
First, what will such an abandonment of physical limits mean for the
administration of patent law? Second, what remaining relationship
must an intangible advance have to physical surroundings in order to
possess the type of consistently achievable, transferable utility that
will qualify the advance as patentable subject matter? Third, will
patent restrictions on the use of intangible information-processing
inventions produce undesirable limitations on the use of related mental
processes?
A. Impact on Patent System Administration
By limiting patentable subject matter to physical advances, earlier
patentable subject matter tests may have simplified certain key
administrative tasks in the patent system in ways that will be lost if
intangible advances can be patented along with physical innovations.
One commentator summarized the possible advantages of a physical
invention limitation on patentable subject matter as follows:
404. See Carson & Nelson, supra note 35, at 205-08.
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The requirement of physical instantiation is not an illogical
one. It ties the relatively abstract proprietary interests
created by the patent law to the corporeal things that form
the traditional objects of property. The identifiable
boundaries that result better enable individuals to complete
transactions, form markets and determine the sorts of
conduct that will be judged permissible. The stricture that
processes generate embodied results also places appropriate
limits upon infringement liability, for the courts may far
more readily observe the market impact of manipulated
objects than trace the effect of more rarefied teachings. In
all these matters the patent law reflected the precepts of the
copyright law, which offers protection only to works fixed
in a tangible medium of expression.
40 5
This sort of argument suggests that there is something inherently
precise and understandable about a physically instantiated device or
process that is necessarily lacking in a purely intangible advance such
as a new information-processing sequence. However, it is unclear that
this is the case. There are several reasons why physically instantiated
inventions may be no easier to describe in patents and to recognize in
potentially infringing activities than intangible inventions.
First, the above argument implies that being able to refer to a
physical unit of a patented item or the physical results of a patented
process lends clarity to the description of a patented invention. Yet,
these physical features are typically not what is protected by a patent
on a physically instantiated invention.40 6 Because a patent typically
does not protect the complete device or process but rather some
functionally critical subset of it, the descriptive benefits of having a
physical example of the implementation of a patented invention may
be modest.
Typically, a patent claim addressing a physically instantiated
invention protects a defined set of features or elements of the
particular invention implementation described in the patent.417 That is,
405. Thomas, supra note 55, at 12-13.
406. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A Guide to Filing a Utility
Patent Application (last modified Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/utility/utility.htm (providing an explanation of
how to describe an invention in a patent application).
407. See id.
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the patent describes at least one working example or "embodiment" of
the invention, but the patent claim-the only legally operative portion
of the patent-protects a narrow set of features of the described item
or process. The item or process that is described in the specification
portion of a patent must include the elements which are sought to be
protected in the patent claim, but the item or process described in the
patent specification will usually not be coextensive with the claimed
invention.40 8 To understand the claimed invention, a reader of the
patent must not focus too much on the physical details of the invention
implementation example described in the patent, but rather must
dissect that example and consider only the specific elements adding up
to the claimed and protected invention. 409 Thus, even when a physical
embodiment of a claimed invention is described in a patent, the
claimed invention is a conceptual entity that is not tangibly present in
a pure form even in the described embodiment, but which can only be
conjured up from that embodiment.
In this respect, claimed inventions-even those with physically
instantiated implementations-are always intangible because they are
conceptual entities rarely constructed by themselves as separate
objects, but rather existing only as conceptual counterparts to real
items and processes. Thus, any notion that invention descriptions and
related infingement assessments are simplified by some form of side-
by-side comparison of physical inventions described in patents with
assertedly infringing devices or processes misconceives the nature of
patent claims and patented inventions. Patent claims always address
intangible subject matters to a degree because they describe
abstractions of the items and processes from which the claims are
derived.410
Second, there is no reason to expect that patent claims derived
from physical items and processes will be any less complex than
claims derived from intangible inventions such as information-
processing advances. Physical elements in a physical invention can
have details, interrelationships, and changing interactions that are
numerous and highly complex. Because of their complexity, these
408. See Carson & Nelson, supra note 35, at 196-97 (providing an example
of a patent claim).
409. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996).
410. See id. at 7480.
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sorts of physical invention elements can be difficult to describe in
patent claims. Many chemical and biological advances in particular
are notoriously detailed and difficult to describe in patent claims.41'
While information-processing arrangements may also be complex,
there is no obvious reason why they are inherently more complex or
less capable of description as a class than the elements of physical
inventions. Hence, arguments that allowing patents for intangible
inventions will somehow dilute the specificity of patent claims and
impair the consistent enforcement of patent rights seem misplaced.
Even if intangible inventions do involve a higher degree of
ambiguity and descriptive complexity than their physically instantiated
counterparts, patent law's confrontation and acceptance of this greater
complexity is probably a price that must be paid to ensure that patent
incentives attach to and encourage information-processing innovations
in the same ways that these rights have promoted advances in physical
technologies. To leave what is arguably the most active and important
field of technological advance today outside the patent system because
useful information-processing innovations lack physical steps is
literally to elevate physical form over policy substance. Valuable
information-processing advances will be delayed or left undeveloped
through this unwise restriction of the patent system.
B. The Continuing Significance of Physical Contexts
While the proposed patentable subject matter standards described
in this Article reject any requirement of physical features in patentable
inventions, the proposed standard may still impose a hidden test for
physical invention features. This hidden test may be implied from the
requirement that a patentable invention operate in a consistent way to
provide valuable results to users. Depending on the way that valuable
results are measured, this need for invention utility may imply a need
for some beneficial interaction between a patentable invention and a
physical environment. Such a version of the utility test would reinject
physical element considerations into patentable subject matter
standards. However, the test would not be a physical component test
but rather a physical context test. That is, the key to showing
411. See generally David J. Weitz, The Biological Deposit Requirement: A
Means of Assuring Adequate Disclosure, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 279 (1993)
(discussing the difficulty of adequately describing biological inventions in
written texts).
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sufficient value in an invention to establish patentable subject matter
would lie in establishing that the invention interacts with a physical
environment or situation in a valuable way.
Courts that have considered the patentability of computer-based
inventions have identified a number of ways that an information-
processing advance may achieve sufficient practical utility to
constitute patentable subject matter.412 While some of the types of
utility found to be sufficient involved physical manipulations or results
produced by physical elements of an information-processing based
device or process, some information-processing based inventions have
been held to be patentable subject matter without this sort of physical
instantiation.413  Decisions that have gone beyond physical
instantiations and examined inventions lacking physical contents have
identified several types of sufficiently useful relationships between
intangible inventions and physical surroundings.4 14 The presence of
these sorts of relationships to physical environments were treated as
sufficient evidence of utility in the inventions involved to make those
415Insotthsreainhpinventions patentable subject matter. In shor these relationships
between information-processing advances and the outside world
distinguish intangible but patentable inventions from mere intellectual
discoveries.
Courts have identified at least three ways that software-based
inventions can produce sufficient practical utility for patenting:
manipulating physical devices to produce desirable physical results,
4 16
manipulating physical means of operation to produce desirable but
intangible results, 4 17 and measuring or interpreting surrounding
physical environments to produce useful but intangible results.
418
While primarily developed in the context of computer-based
inventions, these tests for practical utility and related physical
interactions describe minimum standards for utility that should be
412. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
413. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
414. SeeAlappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
415. See id.
416. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
417. SeeAlappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
418. See State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373.
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incorporated in patentable subject matter standards applied to all types
of inventions.
These utility mechanism tests differ subtly from utility standards
already present in patent laws. Existing utility tests focus on the need
for some degree of beneficial utility in an invention419 whereas the
utility standards described here for assessing the patentability of
information-processing inventions would require that beneficial utility
be achieved through certain mechanisms. Specifically, the utility
mechanism test described here for application as part of patentable
subject matter standards would only be satisfied where positive utility
is achieved through information processing used for the manipulation,
measurement, or interpretation of a physical environment. This
requirement of particular mechanisms for achieving utility is an
important component of patentable subject matter standards in that the
requirement distinguishes purely intellectual and unapplied
information-processing discoveries from useful and patentable
information-processing advances.
1. Physical manipulation of invention results
Software-based inventions sometimes produce useful results by
controlling the operation of physical device or process elements that
are separate from the computer running the software.420 This type of
invention is present where an invention includes a combination of
software, a general-purpose computer programmed in accordance with
the software, and further device or process components that are
controlled by the computer.421  Such an invention is simply a
computer-controlled machine or process, having many of the same
characteristics as an equivalent process or machine that is operated
through human manipulation or some other purely mechanical control
mechanism.
Treating these software-controlled devices and processes as
patentable subject matter merely recognizes that under patent laws,
software-controlled devices and processes should be given parity with
human-controlled devices and processes. 2  That is to say that
419. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-36 (1966).
420. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178-81 (describing a process in which a
computer controlled the operation of a physical device).
421. See id.
422. See generally id. at 187 (discussing the patentability of a software-
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software-controlled devices and processes should be treated for patent
law purposes like their predecessors lacking software-based controls.
If the human-operated version of a software-controlled machine or
process is patentable subject matter absent its software controls, then
the addition of a software-directed control element (or the substitution
of such a control element for some prior control feature) should not
change the patentability of the machine or process. 423 The machine or
process should be deemed to comprise patentable subject matter in
both its computer-based and non-computer forms.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for patent law parity
between computer-controlled and human-controlled devices and
processes in Diamond v. Diehr.424 Diehr involved an information-
processing innovation implemented in a computer-controlled rubber
molding process.425 The Court found that the inclusion of a computer
control feature did not change the essential characteristics of the
invention at stake.426 Both before and after this change, the design
was one for a rubber molding process. 427 Such a process involved a
sufficient sequence of changes in physical structures-i.e., the changes
in both the rubber mold positions being controlled and in the rubber
materials being molded-to make the process a technological design
which could qualify for patent rewards.
428
Inventions like the one in Diehr-where the claimed invention
included both information-processing controls and at least some of the
physical things being controlled-should continue to be seen as
having sufficient mechanisms for achieving practical utility to make
these advances patentable subject matter under the proposed standard.
Means of physical interaction with the external world are present in
components of these inventions, thereby implementing the type of
physically significant utility mechanism needed to make these
inventions patentable subject matter.
controlled process that was a substitute for an earlier human-controlled
process).
423. See id. at 184 n.8.
424. See id. at 175.
425. See id. at 191-92.
426. See id. at 185.
427. See id. at 187.
428. See id. at 183-89.
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2. Physical manipulation of operative means
A different way that a software advance can produce new
physical structures in a device is by causing a general-purpose
computer to operate in particular sequences of electronic states as
dictated by the instructions in the software.429  A general-purpose
computer programmed to perform useful information processing
constitutes patentable subject matter because the software-computer
combination specifies a series of computer state transformations used
to produce a useful result. Rather than achieving utility by
manipulating physical results or ends of information processing, this
type of innovation produces utility by manipulating physical means of
information processing-that is, by manipulating the electronic states
assumed by the computer performing the processing.
This type of advance constitutes patentable subject matter because
it involves a means for improved operation of a preexisting physical
tool-a computer-in order to achieve increased efficiency or
effectiveness. A patentable, technological application is present due to
the involvement of the physical tool being manipulated regardless of
whether that tool is being applied to produce physical results.
430
Innovations involving new programming of computers entail new
429. See In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 874 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
430. Where a physical tool is applied to a purely intellectual or intangible task,
a technological device or process is present because a physical tool is involved.
Thus, for example, a means for operating an electronic device to translate text
from one language to another is a patentable advance because it involves a new
means for operating a physical device. See id. at 877-78. The fact that the
device is applied to a nontechnological task-the intellectual task of language
translation--does not make the method of operating the electronic device
unpatentable subject matter. Rather, as explained by the court in Toma, the
method falls within the technological arts and therefore is patentable subject
matter regardless of the nontechnological ends to which it is applied:
[A] method for enabling a computer to translate natural languages is in
the technological arts, i.e., it is a method of operating a machine. The
"technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether the
claimed subject matter (a method of operating a machine to translate)
is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter
(a translated text) is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the
claimed subject matter purports to replace (translation by human
mind) is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject matter is
presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g.,
whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine.
Id. (citations omitted).
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physical device and process designs in which the coupling of
particular software directions with existing computer circuits achieves
a better computer design or a better means of operating a preexisting
computer. Whether claimed as a new device or a new process, these
software-based improvements in the components and operating
features of a physical tool like a computer possess the practical,
physically situated utility needed to make the computer-based advance
patentable subject matter.
3. Measuring or interpreting data or signals corresponding to
physical surroundings
Another way in which a software-based invention can produce
useful results is by processing data or signals that correspond to
external physical surroundings. Such an invention is present where
software is used to control a computer that is part of a measurement or
analysis system and the system is defined in terms of information-
processing steps without describing the particular software code
statements or the physical computer processing states that are
necessary to implement the system. This type of system for
information processing does not involve physical transformations in
either its operative means or ends. It is a completely intangible
invention consisting of practically useful information-processing
sequences.
Such an invention is a pure information-processing advance in the
sense that it involves a process or device for transforming one type of
information (i.e., data reflecting measurements about a physical
condition) into another type of information (i.e., interpretive results).
The fact that this invention is used to analyze a particular physical
context establishes a sufficient relationship to the physical context and
related practical needs to make the invention a technological advance
that can qualify for patent rewards and incentives. This type of
advance constitutes patentable subject matter because the advance
helps to analyze or interpret a physical condition or characteristic.
431
431. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1058-60 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a method for analyzing
electrocardiographic signals to determine certain characteristics of heart
functions was patentable subject matter because, although the essence of the
method involved complicated numerical processing, "the resultant output is not
an abstract number, but is a signal related to the patient's heart activity").
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed the
patentability of this type of software-based invention in State Street
Bank & Trust Co.432  In that case, the court considered the
patentability of a computer-based process for keeping track of pooled
investments of mutual funds.433  The court held that, while the
computer system at issue was not defined in terms of specific
computer states or steps of operation, this lack of physical details in
the claimed invention did not preclude the invention from being
patentable subject matter.434 In the court's view, patentable subject
matter was present because the system analyzed information about a
physically significant characteristic (i.e., funds in an investment
account), used clearly specified information-processing steps to do so,
and produced a useful result concerning the physical characteristic
under study (i.e., an analysis of each investor's fractional interest in
the pooled funds).435 This linkage of information processing to the
analysis of a specified physical property established a sufficient
mechanism of utility to qualify the invention as patentable subject
matter.
436
4. Information-processing methods producing consistently useful
results, but lacking any particular physical instantiation
The previous three categories of information-processing advances
each involve some useful relationship between information processing
and a specified physical environment. The information processing in
each example is used to manipulate or interpret elements of the
physical context of the invention. However, as described in this
Article, patentable subject matter need not be limited to these sorts of
physically grounded processes. A physical relationship (either
physically transformative or physically interpretive) is sufficient to
define patentable subject matter, but not necessary.
Under the patentable subject matter standard proposed in this
Article, the essential feature of a patentable invention is not a physical
characteristic or relationship but rather a design process. A patentable
432. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
433. See id. at 1370.
434. See id. at 1372-75.
435. See id. at 1374-75.
436. See id. at 1375.
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invention is any repeatedly useful discovery that is capable of
encouragement and dissemination through agency processes. The
invention must perform in a regular, defined manner to achieve
regular, defined utility. These features, while present in physically
transformative or physically interpretive inventions, can also be found
in other, intangible inventions. These further intangible inventions,
capable of being developed by innovator-agents and transferred to
user-principals like tangible inventions, should qualify for patent
protections along with their tangible counterparts.
The characteristics purely intangible inventions need to qualify as
patentable subject matter under the proposed standard can best be
understood by considering these characteristics in the reverse of the
order in which they arise in the use of an invention-that is, results
first and then the means for achieving those results. The results
achieved by an intangible invention will be information that users
wish to obtain, generate, record, or retrieve because of the practical
significance of the information in their businesses or personal
activities.437 Typically, the information-processing steps involved in
the invention will need to be useful to multiple parties, thereby
justifying patent incentives as means to overcome the limitations of
contracting between innovative agents and potential invention users.
An information-processing advance will need to be describable in
terms of well-defined, consistently successful information-processing
steps that do not turn on discretionary choices by users of the
advance.438 To ensure that the utility of the invention is predictable
and measurable, the steps involved in the invention should produce the
same results each time the process is used in a particular setting with a
particular set of inputs.
This combination of consistent operating means and ends should
be treated as patentable subject matter regardless of whether the means
for accomplishing the innovative information processing involve
physical subcomponents or the ends of the information processing
involve physical results. Furthermore, there should be no need for
437. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2C[2] (noting that a patentable
invention must be "operable and capable of satisfying some function of benefit
to humanity").
438. See generally id. § 2C[1][f] (explaining that a patent application must
describe an invention in terms that will enable one with ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention without undue experimentation).
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such an invention to interpret or analyze an external physical context.
Rather, it should be enough that the invention takes information that
the user already values for some reason and then processes that
information in a regular, repeatable fashion to produce new or altered
information with increased utility over that of the original information.
Patent protections for these types of information-processing tools
should serve the same incentive functions for intangible information-
processing advances that patents have long served for physically
situated inventions. Such protections should encourage the
development and public disclosure of new and valuable information-
processing advances.
C. Potential Restrictions on Mental Processes
Patents for purely intangible information-processing inventions of
the sort just described may be undesirable because they reach so far as
to restrict information processing in mental processes. Where an
information-processing sequence is protected by a patent and the same
sequence of information processing is undertaken by an individual as
part of a mental analysis, will these mental steps infringe the patent
involved? Would present patent laws grant a patent holder control
over such mental processes? If so, would this type of control be
consistent with constitutional restrictions on patents imposed by either
the Patent Clause4 39 or the First Amendment? 440
Patent controls over mental processes seem unwise for several
reasons. Aside from the practical patent enforcement problems that
would arise in detecting and acting against "infringing" mental
activities, patent restrictions on mental steps and analyses are probably
inconsistent with First Amendment standards protecting free thought
and expression.44 1 These standards encourage intellectual competition
439. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
440. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
441. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1400 n.20 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting, but
not ruling on, concern expressed by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office that patent claims precluding an individual from thinking in a particular
manner would violate the First Amendment); Dan L. Burk, Software as Speech,
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 683, 690 (1998) (arguing that the mental steps
doctrine previously limited patent rights so as to avoid patent restrictions that
would raise First Amendment issues but that weakening of the mental steps
doctrine means that patent laws may now limit free use of mental processes in
ways that will violate the First Amendment); Gary L. Francione,
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among individuals and groups to develop and disseminate innovative
information processing in the form of alternative analyses,
interpretations, and descriptions of our surroundings and activities.
4 42
Greater diversity of mental steps in support of analytic and descriptive
ends generally enhances society's understanding of various activities.
Because of the societal benefits flowing from these results, legal
scholars generally disfavor restrictions on mental processes that will
curtail the reuse in personal analyses of useful information-processing
methods.
443
However, this sort of freedom of thought and analysis is not the
only consideration in deciding how the patent system should
encourage innovation concerning intangible information-processing
methods. In these settings, there is a countervailing public policy in
favor of providing temporary restrictions on new information-
processing use as an inducement and reward for the development of
the new methods. In short, the typical incentive logic of the patent
system still applies. The ultimate question is whether this logic
should, in the narrow area of practically useful information processing,
trump the normal countervailing logic of freedom of thought and
expression underlying aspects of First Amendment doctrine.
The conflict between patent incentives and intellectual freedom
protections arises because certain types of mental analyses are not just
mental or intellectual exercises, but rather information analyses with
substantial, transferable utility. These sorts of innovations can be tools
for individuals or businesses much like physical tools such as phones
or screwdrivers. As such, use of these intangible, but consistently
operative and useful information-processing tools may be restrictable
under patent laws enacted under the Patent Clause of the Constitution
in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to less practically
useful intellectual or political ideas and analyses. Such a view might
Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 417, 512 (1987) (noting that patent limitations on the use of certain
new items may restrict academic freedom regarding further research addressing
those items but questioning whether the First Amendment will protect free
pursuit of such research); Kreiss, supra note 88, at 86 (arguing that "a claimed
patent on a process for improving gymnastics performances by mentally
visualizing the entire routine prior to performing it should be barred from
patentable subject matter on First Amendment grounds").
442. See Francione, supra note 441, at 427-30.
443. See id.
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be premised on the notion that the type of temporary restriction on
information-processing techniques imposed under patent laws
encourages the development of new techniques in the long run and,
hence, enhances information processing alternatives in a way that does
not conflict with the First Amendment.
The development of new constitutional doctrines to address this
problem is beyond the scope of this Article. However, there may be
little need to develop such doctrines. Patents that are drafted broadly
enough to limit information-processing sequences in mental processes
will probably be rare. Most of the information-processing sequences
that are likely to be submitted for patent protection will entail
sufficiently complex or extensive information processing that they are
unlikely to be undertaken through purely mental processes. Rather,
the methods sought to be protected will typically be information-
processing methods that are peculiarly-indeed, perhaps
exclusively-suited for computer implementation. Precluding mental
use of new information processes by enforcing patent protections will
not be a significant problem because individual use of most patented
information-handling processes will either be impossible or seldom
undertaken.
Even if some patented information-processing methods are used
in mental processes, there is a simple means to prevent patent rights
from limiting these mental processes. This problem can be avoided by
adjusting patent infringement standards to treat the use of a patented
method in purely mental activities as a specially protected, liability-
free activity. This approach will carve out and protect a sphere of
mental "fair use" of intangible information-processing innovations.
This type of adjustment of inffingement standards is preferable to
leaving intangible advances outside of patentable subject matter
generally. Recognizing patent rights for innovative information-
processing inventions generally and then holding mental use of those
processes to be noninfringing retains patent rights and incentives for
all information-processing designs aimed at computer-based
applications and other electronically implemented information
processing.
Since most new information-processing methods will be
developed for computer implementations that will still be governed by
patent controls and rewards, the gap in patent rights created by the
above adjustment in infringement standards will not substantially
466
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lessen incentives for the development of innovative information-
processing methods. Only the few-if any-incidental personal uses
of the new methods in mental analyses will be able to proceed without
patent controls and inventor rewards. Such a small omission from the
overall scheme of patent controls and rewards will probably have little
negative effect. The fact that most computer-based uses of the
patented information-processing inventions will be protected will
create sufficient economic incentives for beneficial information-
processing innovations.
VII. CONCLUSION
As information-processing advances assume central roles in our
understanding and control of useful activities and physical
phenomena, patent rewards should encourage intangible, information-
processing inventions in the same way that patent rights have
previously encouraged tangible inventions. Tests for patentable
subject matter that tie opportunities for patent rewards to the presence
of physically transformative or interpretive inventions have placed
outdated physical bounds on the incentives that the patent system was
intended to create. The nature of the "useful arts" has changed to
include intangible information-processing innovations. The patent
system must change as well to embrace and encourage new modes of
design and engineering that emphasize intangible procedures or
practices with practical utility.
This Article has proposed new standards for patentable subject
matter that will encourage innovations in intangible inventions. These
new standards recognize that inventions are often products of agency
processes in which an inventor acts as the agent of a group of
principals comprised of the potential users of the inventor's
discoveries. The new patentability standards described here encourage
innovators to extend this agency framework to intangible inventions.
Useful innovations that are susceptible to development by
innovative agents and transferable to user-principals constitute
patentable subject matter under the new standards. The standards
reflect the view that where innovation through agency processes is
likely to be effective, patentable subject matter should be found to
ensure that the incentives of the patent system will attach. Such an
approach ensures that patent incentives are coextensive with the scope
of potentially beneficial agency relationships supporting innovation.
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The patentable subject matter standards developed in this Article
do not require physical invention features in patentable inventions but
rather turn on the presence of more basic invention characteristics
that facilitate innovation through agency methods. Physically
transformative or physically interpretive devices and processes will
typically have the features required to be patentable subject matter
under the new standards, but will not be the only inventions with these
features. Hence, the new tests for patentable subject matter are
consistent with older tests emphasizing physically transformative or
interpretive features, but are not limited to the physically situated
inventions covered by those older tests.
Ultimately, the range of patents and patent incentives that will
result from these new patentable subject matter tests will depend on
additional factors. The recognition that an intangible invention
constitutes patentable subject matter only means that the innovation
may qualify for patent protections and rewards. To gain these, the
innovation must still be novel, a substantial, nonobvious advance over
prior knowledge in the same field, and the subject of a timely patent
application. Relatively few intangible advances may meet all of these
standards. In particular, the requirement of a substantial, nonobvious
advance over prior knowledge about tangible or intangible methods
for undertaking similar tasks may be hard to meet. A great many
intangible inventions may be no more than abstractions of previously
existing tangible methods for undertaking similar tasks. As such, the
intangible inventions may be obvious and unpatentable. All that the
new, physically-unbound patentability standards proposed here will do
is ensure that these further tests regarding patentability will be
addressed for intangible inventions and that innovators producing
substantial intangible advances will have an opportunity to gain patent
rewards on the same terms that those rewards are granted to
developers of tangible inventions.
The possibility that even a few widely used intangible innovations
will be developed and disclosed to the public due to the promise of
patent rewards provides a sound bazis for extending the patent system
to these innovations. The increasing importance of innovations in
intangible information-processing methodologies heightens the
significance of encouraging the best and fastest innovations in this
area through the same types of patent incentives that have previously
enhanced physical innovations. Patentable subject matter standards
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for intangible inventions are a substantial step forward, equal in
importance to the many useful intangible advances the new standards
will encourage and the associated societal benefits those advances will
bring.
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